The development of inexpensive small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) technologies and the growing desire of hobbyists to have more and more capability have created a sustained sUAS industry, however these capabilities are directly enabling the ability of adversaries to threaten U.S. interests. In response to these threats, the U.S. Army and other Department of Defense (DoD) organizations have invested significantly in counter-sUAS technologies, often focusing on detecting radio frequency transmissions by sUASs and/or their operators, and jamming the radio frequency command and control links and Global Positioning System signals of individual sUASs. However, today's consumer and customized sUASs can increasingly operate without radio frequency command and control links by using automated target recognition and tracking, obstacle avoidance, and other software-enabled capabilities. The U.S. Army tasked the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct a study to address the above concerns. In particular, the committee was asked to assess the sUAS threat, particularly when massed and collaborating; assess current capabilities of battalion-and- below infantry units to counter sUASs; identify counter-sUAS technologies appropriate for near- term, mid-term, and far-term science and technology investment; consider human factors and logistics; and determine if the Department of Homeland Security could benefit from DoD efforts. This abbreviated report provides background information on the full report and the committee that prepared it.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are an integral part of the US national critical infrastructure. They must be protected from hostile intent or use to the same level as any other military or commercial asset involved in US national security. However, from the Spratly Islands to Djibouti to heartland America, the expanding Chinese Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS / Drone) industry has outpaced the US technologically and numerically on all fronts: military, commercial, and recreational. Both countries found that there were large information security gaps in unmanned systems that could be exploited on the international cyber-security stage. Many of those gaps remain today and are direct threats to US advanced Air Assets if not mitigated upfront by UAS designers and manufacturers. The authors contend that US military / commercial developers of UAS hardware and software must perform cyber risk assessments and mitigations prior to delivery of UAS systems to stay internationally competitive and secure. The authors have endeavored to bring a breadth and quality of information to the reader that is unparalleled in the unclassified sphere. This book will fully immerse and engage the reader in the cyber-security considerations of this rapidly emerging technology that we know as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Topics covered include National Airspace (NAS) policy issues, information security, UAS vulnerabilities in key systems (Sense and Avoid / SCADA), collision avoidance systems, stealth design, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; weapons systems security; electronic warfare considerations; data-links, jamming operational vulnerabilities and still-emerging political scenarios that affect US military / commercial decisions.

"To be sure, manned systems could accomplish many if not all of the same goals. But "unmanned systems reduce the risk to our warfighters by providing a sophisticated stand-off capability that supports intelligence, command and control, targeting, and weapons delivery. These systems also improve situational awareness and reduce many of the emotional hazards inherent in air and ground combat, thus decreasing the likelihood of causing civilian noncombatant casualties." "UAVs have gained favor as ways to reduce risk to combat troops, the cost of hardware and the reaction time in a surgical strike" and "to conduct missions in areas that are difficult to access or otherwise considered too high-risk for manned aircraft or personnel on the ground."--Page 3 (author).

Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) have become increasingly prevalent in and important to U.S. military operations. Initially serving only as reconnaissance or intelligence platforms, they now carry out such other missions as attacking enemy forces. The swift expansion in their numbers and in the demand for their employment has, however, significantly increased demands on logistics and training systems. The challenge is not simply training system operators but also training operational forces and their commanders to integrate the systems into combat operations. Much of that aspect of training has thus far happened as units employ the systems in actual operations - essentially, on-the-job training. UAS training, particularly for the employment of UASs, now needs to be integrated more formally and cost-effectively into service and joint training programs. This report develops a general concept for training military forces in employment of UASs and a framework for addressing the training requirements and discusses the limits of existing infrastructure in supporting UAS training. Interoperability among services is another issue, because services have thus far mainly developed training suitable for their own needs. But the services have established a set of multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures for UASs, which should facilitate interoperability training. At present, units are not always ready for joint training, so the focus should be on improving training at the unit level in the employment of UAS capabilities, with the overall guiding principle being to "train as we fight."

This is a reproduction of an important Department of Defense (DOD) strategy document describing in broad terms how joint forces will operate in response to emerging antiaccess and area-denial security challenges. From the foreword by Martin Dempsey: Due to three major trends - the growth of antiaccess and area-denial capabilities around the globe, the changing U.S. overseas defense posture, and the emergence of space and cyberspace as contested domains - future enemies, both states and nonstates, see the adoption of antiaccess/area-denial strategies against the United States as a favorable course of action for them. The JOAC describes how future joint forces will achieve operational access in the face of such strategies. Its central thesis is Cross-Domain Synergy-the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others-to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of action required by the mission. The JOAC envisions a greater degree of integration across domains and at lower echelons than ever before. Embracing cross-domain synergy at increasingly lower levels will be essential to generating the tempo that is often critical to exploiting fleeting local opportunities for disrupting the enemy system. The JOAC also envisions a greater degree and more flexible integration of space and cyberspace operations into the traditional air-sea-land battlespace than ever before. Each Service has an important role in ensuring Joint Operational Access. The JOAC was developed by representatives from each of the Services and the Joint Staff in coordination with the combatant commands, multinational partners, and other stakeholders. The JOAC development was supported by an experimentation campaign including a multi-scenario wargame, multiple Service-sponsored events, and other concept development venues. The strategic challenge is clear: the Joint Force must maintain the freedom of action to accomplish any assigned mission. The Joint Operational Access Concept is a critical first step in ensuring the joint force has the requisite capabilities to do so. This paper proposes a concept for how joint forces will achieve operational access in the face of armed opposition by a variety of potential enemies and under a variety of conditions, as part of a broader national approach. Operational access is the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Operational access does not exist for its own sake, but rather serves our broader strategic goals, whether to ensure access to commerce, demonstrate U.S. resolve by positioning forces overseas to manage crisis and prevent war, or defeat an enemy in war. Operational access is the joint force contribution to assured access, the unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace. Enduring requirement for force projection. Distinction between antiaccess and area-denial. Importance of preconditions.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 mandates a review of missile defeat policy, strategy, and capability to be completed by January 2018. This upcoming Missile Defeat Review (MDR) represents an opportunity for the Trump administration to articulate a vision for the future of air and missile defense. This collection of expert essays explores how the strategic environment for missile defense and defeat has evolved since 2010 and offers recommendations to help guide and inform the MDR’s development.