Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for develop­ing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units—combat, support, and headquarters—that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army’s ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. By the summer of 2003, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had markedly strained the Army. General Peter J. Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army as of 1 August 2003, believed that these operations, along with the demands of an open-ended Global War on Terror, called for a major change in how the service organized its forces. In early September 2003, he ordered the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to begin the process of converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. The chief of staff identified the 3d Infantry Division, scheduled to return to Iraq in early 2005, as the first formation to change to a modular structure. He also directed that normal force development methods not be used. Instead, an ad hoc group, Task Force Modularity, would draw up the modular force plans. By the time the task force disbanded in February 2005, most of the major design decisions for the modular force had been made and modular brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division had deployed to Iraq. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army’s program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.

The world is in the midst of a cataclysmic transformation caused by the demise of the Soviet Union as a world military power. The impact of this transformation is being felt around the globe. The impact on the United States, as the world's only remaining 'superpower' transcends all elements of its society and institutions. The Army, one of America's oldest and proudest institutions, is struggling to posture itself to remain viable and relevant in the future. The principles under which it has been organized and structured during the Cold War era are no longer appropriate. While several ideas and concepts have been proposed for the Army's future force design, all are hybrids of the past and fail to recognize the magnitude of the change that is occurring. This study examines some of the issues surrounding the efforts to design an Army of the future. It is an attempt to understand the basis for the Army and to offer a set of principles under which a new paradigm should be constructed for use in designing the Army of the future. It also suggests ways Army leaders can restructure the Army into a true Total Army to meet these principles. It also offers ideas concerning incorporation of the Army National Guard as an integral and equal partner on the Total Army team.

The world is in the midst of a cataclysmic transformation caused by the demise of the Soviet Union as a world military power. The impact of this transformation is being felt around the globe. The impact on the United States, as the world's only remaining 'superpower' transcends all elements of its society and institutions. The Army, one of America's oldest and proudest institutions, is struggling to posture itself to remain viable and relevant in the future. The principles under which it has been organized and structured during the Cold War era are no longer appropriate. While several ideas and concepts have been proposed for the Army's future force design, all are hybrids of the past and fail to recognize the magnitude of the change that is occurring. This study examines some of the issues surrounding the efforts to design an Army of the future. It is an attempt to understand the basis for the Army and to offer a set of principles under which a new paradigm should be constructed for use in designing the Army of the future. It also suggests ways Army leaders can restructure the Army into a true Total Army to meet these principles. It also offers ideas concerning incorporation of the Army National Guard as an integral and equal partner on the Total Army team.

This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)

This work provides an organizational history of the maneuver brigade and case studies of its employment throughout the various wars. Apart from the text, the appendices at the end of the work provide a ready reference to all brigade organizations used in the Army since 1917 and the history of the brigade colors.