This book reconstructs and explains the arms relationship that successive U.S. administrations developed with the Shah of Iran between 1950 and 1979. This relationship has generally been neglected in the extant literature leading to a series of omissions and distortions in the historical record. By detailing how and why Iran transitioned from a primitive military aid recipient in the 1950s to America’s primary military credit customer in the late 1960s and 1970s, this book provides a detailed and original contribution to the understanding of a key Cold War episode in U.S. foreign policy. By drawing on extensive declassified documents from more than 10 archives, the investigation demonstrates not only the importance of the arms relationship but also how it reflected, and contributed to, the wider evolution of U.S.-Iranian relations from a position of Iranian client state dependency to a situation where the U.S. became heavily leveraged to the Shah for protection of the Gulf and beyond – until the policy met its disastrous end in 1979 as an antithetical regime took power in Iran. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East studies, US Foreign Policy and Security studies and for those seeking better foundations for which to gain an understanding of U.S. foreign policy in the final decade of the Cold War, and beyond.

This book reconstructs and explains the arms relationship that successive U.S. administrations developed with the Shah of Iran between 1950 and 1979. This relationship has generally been neglected in the extant literature leading to a series of omissions and distortions in the historical record. By detailing how and why Iran transitioned from a primitive military aid recipient in the 1950s to America’s primary military credit customer in the late 1960s and 1970s, this book provides a detailed and original contribution to the understanding of a key Cold War episode in U.S. foreign policy. By drawing on extensive declassified documents from more than 10 archives, the investigation demonstrates not only the importance of the arms relationship but also how it reflected, and contributed to, the wider evolution of U.S.-Iranian relations from a position of Iranian client state dependency to a situation where the U.S. became heavily leveraged to the Shah for protection of the Gulf and beyond – until the policy met its disastrous end in 1979 as an antithetical regime took power in Iran. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East studies, US Foreign Policy and Security studies and for those seeking better foundations for which to gain an understanding of U.S. foreign policy in the final decade of the Cold War, and beyond.

In this revisionist account of U.S.-Iran relations during the Cold War, Roham Alvandi provides a detailed historical study of the partnership that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran forged with U.S. President Richard Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger in the 1970s.

In this book, Thomas L. McNaugher offers a military strategy that integrates U. S. forces into the security framework that already exists in the region.

Collier presents a timely and fresh reexamination of one of the most important bilateral relationships of the last century. He delves deeply into the American desire to promote democracy in Iran from the 1940s through the early 1960s and examines the myriad factors that contributed to their success in exerting a powerful influence on Iranian politics. By creating a framework to understand the efficacy of external pressure, Collier explains how the United States later relinquished this control during the 1960s and 1970s. During this time, the shah emerged as a dominant and effective political operator who took advantage of waning American influence to assert his authority. Collier reveals how this shifting power dynamic transformed the former client-patron relationship into one approaching equality.

"A history of the relationship between Iran and America from the 1700s through the current day"--

William Morgan Shuster (1877-1960) was an American lawyer and financial expert who served as treasurer general to the government of the Persian Empire in 1911. In 1910, the Persian government asked U.S. president William Howard Taft for technical assistance in reorganizing its financial system. Taft chose Shuster to head a mission of American experts to Tehran. The Strangling of Persia is Shuster's account of his experiences, published soon after his return to the United States. In the Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907, Britain and Russia had divided Persia (present-day Iran) into a Russian sphere of influence in the north of the empire and a British sphere in the south (with additional arrangements for Afghanistan and Tibet). Each power was to have exclusive commercial rights in its sphere. Under this agreement and other arrangements, Persian customs revenues were collected to guarantee the payment of interest and principal on foreign loans. Seeking to defend the interests of the Persians, Shuster clashed repeatedly with Russian and British officials, until his mission was forced to withdraw in early 1912. The book provides a detailed account of the background to the mission, of political and financial conditions in Persia in the early 20th century, and of the rivalry among Russia, Britain, and eventually Germany for influence in the country. The narrative covers the Russian military intervention of 1911, the atrocities committed by Russian troops, and the coup and dissolution of the Majlis (parliament) carried out under Russian pressure in December 1911. The book includes numerous photographs and a map, an index, and an appendix with copies of key documents and correspondence