Using historical examples, this book attempts to demonstrate that unregulated banking can be successful and that central banks' beneficial contribution has been greatly exaggerated. Topics covered include a description of the experiment with free banking during the French Revolution.

The study of financial history has never been more important. This volume focuses on theories about the relationship of financial markets to the rest of the economy. Searching out information on financial institutions and markets from the past, this work tests theories from the 1980s and 90s with this data, mainly in two fields of economics: financial structure and performance and economic development. Understanding and testing the relationship between money and credit and the level of output in the economy, the author emphasizes, may help predict or prevent business cycles and even make it possible to increase the rate of development and growth of an economy. Although this volume focuses on one geographical and historical area of the US economy, the lessons and implications are relevant for the global economy of the 21st century.

Can the 'invisible hand' handle money? George Selgin challenges the view that government regulation creates monetary order and stability, and instead shows it to be the main source of monetary crisis. The volume is divided into three sections: * Part I refutes conventional wisdom holding that any monetary system lacking government regulation is 'inherently unstable', and looks at the workings of market forces in an otherwise unregulated banking system. * Part II draws on both theory and historical experience to show how various kinds of government interference undermine the inherent efficiency, safety, and stability of a free monetary system. * Part III completes the argument by addressing the popular misconception that a monetary system is unsound unless it delivers a stable output price-level.

The book shows the fundaments of the shadow banking system and its entities, operations and risks. Focusing on the regulatory aspects, it provides an original view that is able to demonstrate that the lack of supervision is a market failure.

From 1716 to 1845, Scotland’s banks were among the most dynamic and resilient in Europe, effectively absorbing a series of adverse economic shocks that rocked financial markets in London and on the continent. Legislating Instability explains the seeming paradox that the Scottish banking system achieved this success without the government controls usually considered necessary for economic stability. Eighteenth-century Scottish banks operated in a regulatory vacuum: no central bank to act as lender of last resort, no monopoly on issuing currency, no legal requirements for maintaining capital reserves, and no formal limits on bank size. These conditions produced a remarkably robust banking system, one that was intensely competitive and served as a prime engine of Scottish economic growth. Despite indicators that might have seemed red flags—large speculative capital flows, a fixed exchange rate, and substantial external debt—Scotland successfully navigated two severe financial crises during the Seven Years’ War. The exception was a severe financial crisis in 1772, seven years after the imposition of the first regulations on Scottish banking—the result of aggressive lobbying by large banks seeking to weed out competition. While these restrictions did not cause the 1772 crisis, Tyler Beck Goodspeed argues, they critically undermined the flexibility and resilience previously exhibited by Scottish finance, thereby elevating the risk that another adverse economic shock, such as occurred in 1772, might threaten financial stability more broadly. Far from revealing the shortcomings of unregulated banking, as Adam Smith claimed, the 1772 crisis exposed the risks of ill-conceived bank regulation.