"The structural changes that come with privatization may induce a reconsideration of the regulations defined during the early stages of privatization"--Cover.

The structural changes that come with privatization may induce a reconsideration of the regulations defined during the early stages of privatization.Chisari and Estache summarize the main lessons emerging from Argentina's experience, including universal service obligations in concession contracts. They discuss free-riding risks, moral hazard problems, and other issues that arise when social concerns are delegated to private operators.After reporting on Argentina's experience, Chisari and Estache suggest ome guidelines:middot; Anticipate interjurisdictional externalities. Users' mobility makes targeting service obligations difficult.middot; Minimize the risks imposed by elusive demand. In providing new services, a gradual policy may work better than a shock.middot; Realize that unemployment leads to delinquency and lower expected tariffs. Elasticity of fixed and usage charges is important.middot; Deal with the fact that the poor have limited access to credit. Ultimately, plans that included credit for the payment of infrastructure charges were not that successful.middot; Coordinate regulatory, employment, and social policy. One successful plan to provide universal service involved employing workers from poor families in infrastructure extension works.middot; Beware of the latent opportunism of users who benefit from special programs. Special treatment of a sector may encourage free-riding (for example, pensioners overused the telephone until a limit was placed on the number of subsidized phone calls they could make).middot; Fixed allocations for payment of services do not ensure that universal service obligations will be met. How do you deal with the problem that many pensioners do not pay their bills?middot; Anticipate that operators will have more information than regulators do. If companies exaggerate supply costs in remote areas, direct interaction with poor users there may lead to the selection of more cost-effective technologies.middot; Tailored programs are often much more effective than standardized programs. They are clearly more expensive but, when demand-driven, are also more effective.This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

The Uruguay Round tariff negotiations did not achieve a country-by-country balancing of concessions received. How governments bargained was determined less by their national interets than by the interests of their politically important industrial constituencies.

Public–Private Partnerships (PPP or 3Ps) allow the public sector to seek alternative funding and expertise from the private sector during procurement processes. Such partnerships, if executed with due diligence, often benefit the public immensely. Unfortunately, Public–Private Partnerships can be vulnerable to corruption. This book looks at what measures we can put in place to check corruption during procurement and what good governance strategies the public sector can adopt to improve the performance of 3Ps. The book applies mathematical models to analyze 3Ps. It uses game theory to study the interaction and dynamics between the stakeholders and suggests strategies to reduce corruption risks in various 3Ps stages. The authors explain through game theory-based simulation how governments can adopt a evaluating process at the start of each procurement to weed out undesirable private partners and why the government should take a more proactive approach. Using a methodological framework rooted in mathematical models to illustrate how we can combat institutional corruption, this book is a helpful reference for anyone interested in public policymaking and public infrastructure management.

Abstract: December 1999 - Nonfarm economic growth in India had very different effects on poverty in different states. Nonfarm growth was least effective at reducing poverty in states where initial conditions were poor in terms of rural development and human resources. Among initial conditions conducive to pro-poor growth, literacy plays a notably positive role. Ravallion and Datt use 20 household surveys for India's 15 major states, spanning 1960-94, to study how initial conditions and the sectoral composition of economic growth interact to influence how much economic growth reduced poverty. The elasticities of measured poverty to farm yields and development spending did not differ significantly across states. But the elasticities of poverty to (urban and rural) nonfarm output varied appreciably, and the differences were quantitatively important to the overall rate of poverty reduction. States with initially lower farm productivity, lower rural living standards relative to those in urban areas, and lower literacy experienced a less pro-poor growth process. This paper - a joint product of Poverty and Human Resources, Development Research Group, and the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to better understand the conditions required for pro-poor growth. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

Considering sustainability in its economic, environmental and social contexts, the contributors take stock of previous research on large technical systems and discuss their sustainability from three main perspectives: uses, cities, and rules and institutions.