Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, grade: 2, University of Wyoming (Political Science), course: Psychology of war and conflicts, language: English, abstract: The United States of America under President John F. Kennedy showed almost no military reaction after the raising of the Berlin Wall. They sent more troops together with Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to West Berlin, but there was no intention to reopen the border. Instead the US Government tried to get into negotiations with the Soviet Union about the status of West Berlin. This decision avoided transforming the Cold War into a Hot War, but it also manifested the separation of East and West Germany and made the unification in the near future less likely. The decision helped to establish another socialist state in Europe and locked up 17 million Germans within the borders of East Germany. This paper will focus on the question why President Kennedy and his main advisers decided the way they did. Did they fear the military strength and the use of the Soviet nuclear arsenal? Or did they think they could reach better results by negotiating? Or did they just trade the eastern part of Germany against a secure status quo for West Berlin? Maybe the situation was seen more as a chance for stability than as a threat? The basic information for this research will come from the Digital National Security Archive. The original documents should show who gave information to President Kennedy and his advisers. Who were the talking heads during the decision-making process? Who had the most influence? Was it only an inner-American process or were other allies involved, too? An interesting question is, if there is a change between the evaluation of the situation before and after the raising of the Berlin Wall. So this research will compare some documents before and after the crisis.

Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - Region: USA, grade: 2, University of Wyoming (Political Science), course: Psychology of war and conflicts, language: English, abstract: The United States of America under President John F. Kennedy showed almost no military reaction after the raising of the Berlin Wall. They sent more troops together with Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to West Berlin, but there was no intention to reopen the border. Instead the US Government tried to get into negotiations with the Soviet Union about the status of West Berlin. This decision avoided transforming the Cold War into a Hot War, but it also manifested the separation of East and West Germany and made the unification in the near future less likely. The decision helped to establish another socialist state in Europe and locked up 17 million Germans within the borders of East Germany. This paper will focus on the question why President Kennedy and his main advisers decided the way they did. Did they fear the military strength and the use of the Soviet nuclear arsenal? Or did they think they could reach better results by negotiating? Or did they just trade the eastern part of Germany against a secure status quo for West Berlin? Maybe the situation was seen more as a chance for stability than as a threat? The basic information for this research will come from the Digital National Security Archive. The original documents should show who gave information to President Kennedy and his advisers. Who were the talking heads during the decision-making process? Who had the most influence? Was it only an inner-American process or were other allies involved, too? An interesting question is, if there is a change between the evaluation of the situation before and after the raising of the Berlin Wall. So this research will compare some documents before and after the crisis.

On the night of November 9, 1989, massive crowds surged toward the Berlin Wall, drawn by an announcement that caught the world by surprise: East Germans could now move freely to the West. The Wall—infamous symbol of divided Cold War Europe—seemed to be falling. But the opening of the gates that night was not planned by the East German ruling regime—nor was it the result of a bargain between either Ronald Reagan or George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. It was an accident. In The Collapse, prize-winning historian Mary Elise Sarotte reveals how a perfect storm of decisions made by daring underground revolutionaries, disgruntled Stasi officers, and dictatorial party bosses sparked an unexpected series of events culminating in the chaotic fall of the Wall. With a novelist’s eye for character and detail, she brings to vivid life a story that sweeps across Budapest, Prague, Dresden, and Leipzig and up to the armed checkpoints in Berlin. We meet the revolutionaries Roland Jahn, Aram Radomski, and Siggi Schefke, risking it all to smuggle the truth across the Iron Curtain; the hapless Politburo member Günter Schabowski, mistakenly suggesting that the Wall is open to a press conference full of foreign journalists, including NBC’s Tom Brokaw; and Stasi officer Harald Jäger, holding the fort at the crucial border crossing that night. Soon, Brokaw starts broadcasting live from Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate, where the crowds are exulting in the euphoria of newfound freedom—and the dictators are plotting to restore control. Drawing on new archival sources and dozens of interviews, The Collapse offers the definitive account of the night that brought down the Berlin Wall.

Twenty years after its fall, the wall that divided Berlin and Germany presents a conceptual paradox: on one hand, Germans have sought to erase it completely; on the other, it haunts the imagination in complex and often surprising ways

Traces the history of the Marshall Plan and the efforts to reconstruct western Europe as a bulwark against communist authoritarianism during a two-year period that saw the collapse of postwar U.S.-Soviet relations and the beginning of the Cold War.

The Berlin Wall was the symbol of the Cold War. For the first time, this path-breaking book tells the behind-the-scenes story of the communists' decision to build the Wall in 1961. Hope Harrison's use of archival sources from the former East German and Soviet regimes is unrivalled, and from these sources she builds a highly original and provocative argument: the East Germans pushed the reluctant Soviets into building the Berlin Wall. This fascinating work portrays the different approaches favored by the East Germans and the Soviets to stop the exodus of refugees to West Germany. In the wake of Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviets refused the East German request to close their border to West Berlin. The Kremlin rulers told the hard-line East German leaders to solve their refugee problem not by closing the border, but by alleviating their domestic and foreign problems. The book describes how, over the next seven years, the East German regime managed to resist Soviet pressures for liberalization and instead pressured the Soviets into allowing them to build the Berlin Wall. Driving the Soviets Up the Wall forces us to view this critical juncture in the Cold War in a different light. Harrison's work makes us rethink the nature of relations between countries of the Soviet bloc even at the height of the Cold War, while also contributing to ongoing debates over the capacity of weaker states to influence their stronger allies.