A detailed account of the Americans' first ground offensive against the Japanese in World War II, which occurred in August 1942 on the island of Guadalcanal.

“Brilliant...an enormous work based on the most meticulous research.”—LA Times Book Review The battle at Guadalcanal—which began eight months to the day after Pearl Harbor—marked the first American offensive of World War II. It was a brutal six-month campaign that cost the lives of some 7,000 Americans and over 30,000 Japanese. This volume, ten years in the writing, recounts the full story of the critical campaign for Guadalcanal and is based on first-time translations of official Japanese Defense Agency accounts and recently declassified U.S. radio intelligence, Guadalcanal recreates the battle—on land, at sea, and in the air—as never before: it examines the feelings of both American and Japanese soldiers, the strategies and conflicts of their commanders, and the strengths and weaknesses of various fighting units.

TO HELL AND BACK For the U.S., Guadalcanal was a bloody seven-month struggle under brutal conditions against crack Japanese troops deeply entrenched and determined to fight to the death. For Charles Walker, this horrific jungle battle–one that claimed the lives of 1,600 Americans and more than 23,000 Japanese–was just the beginning. On the eve of battle, 2nd Lt. Walker was ordered back to the States for medical reasons. But there was a war to be won, and he had no intention of missing it. In this devastatingly powerful memoir, Walker captures the conflict in all its horror, chaos, and heroism: the hunger, the heat, the deafening explosions and stench of death, the constant fear broken by moments of sheer terror. This is the gripping tale of the brave young American men who fought with tremendous courage in appalling conditions, willing to sacrifice everything for their country. Look for these books about Americans who fought World War II: VISIONS FROM A FOXHOLE A Rifleman in Patton’s Ghost Corps by William A. Foley Jr. BEHIND HITLER’S LINES The True Story of the Only Soldier to Fight for Both America and the Soviet Union in World War II by Thomas H. Taylor NO BENDED KNEE The Battle for Guadalcanal by Gen. Merrill B. Twining, USMC (Ret.) ALL THE WAY TO BERLIN A Paratrooper at War in Europe by James Megellas

[Includes 3 charts, 36 maps and 107 illustrations] "The successes of the South Pacific Force," wrote Admiral Halsey in 1944, "were not the achievements of separate services or individuals but the result of whole-hearted subordination of self-interest by all in order that one successful ‘fighting team’ could be created." The history of any South Pacific campaign must deal with this "fighting team," with all United States and Allied services. The victory on Guadalcanal can be understood only by an appreciation of the contribution of each service. No one service won the battle. The most decisive engagement of the campaign was the air and naval Battle of Guadalcanal in mid-November 1942, an engagement in which neither Army nor Marine Corps ground troops took any direct part. This volume attempts to show the contribution of all services to the first victory on the long road to Tokyo. It does not describe all ground, air, and naval operations in detail but it does attempt, by summary when necessary, to show the relationship between air, ground, and surface forces in modern warfare.

The Marine Corps covered itself in glory in World War II with victories over the Japanese in hard-fought battles such as Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. While these battles are well known, those who led the Marines into them have remained obscure until now. In Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II, Stephen R. Taaffe analyzes the fifteen high-level Marine generals who led the Corps' six combat divisions and two corps in the conflict. He concludes that these leaders played an indispensable and unheralded role in organizing, training, and leading their men to victory. Taaffe insists there was nothing inevitable about the Marine Corps' success in World War II. The small pre-war size of the Corps meant that its commandant had to draw his combat leaders from a small pool of officers who often lacked the education of their Army and Navy counterparts. Indeed, there were fewer than one hundred Marine officers with the necessary rank, background, character, and skills for its high-level combat assignments. Moreover, the Army and Navy froze the Marines out of high-level strategic decisions and frequently impinged on Marine prerogatives. There were no Marines in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or at the head of the Pacific War's geographic theaters, so the Marines usually had little influence over the island targets selected for them. In addition to bureaucratic obstacles, constricted geography and vicious Japanese opposition limited opportunities for Marine generals to earn the kind of renown that Army and Navy commanders achieved elsewhere. In most of its battles on small Pacific War islands, Marine generals had neither the option nor inclination to engage in sophisticated tactics, but they instead relied in direct frontal assaults that resulted in heavy casualties. Such losses against targets of often questionable strategic value sometimes called into question the Marine Corps' doctrine, mission, and the quality of its combat generals. Despite these difficulties, Marine combat commanders repeatedly overcame challenges and fulfilled their missions. Their ability to do so does credit to the Corps and demonstrates that these generals deserve more attention from historians than they have so far received.