This book is a reprint of the dissertation that won the 2009 Prize of the Pontifical Academies. The analogy of names is not one of those topics that is important because it is a grand conclusion to intensive philosophical or theological research. Rather, analogy is important because it stands, explicitly or implicitly, at the very beginning of all work in philosophy and theology. For centuries, the thoughts of St. Thomas on analogy, which are found in texts scattered throughout his works, were considered to have been aptly grouped and articulated by Cardinal Cajetan. Most works on analogy in Aquinas since the time of Cajetan merely repeat what Cajetan said. This book approaches the question afresh, returning to the works of St. Thomas in order to find what he thought was the fundamental meaning of the word 'analogy.' Not only are several misconceptions about analogy cleared up, but a description is given of the way that God is first in our thoughts, as well as in reality.

The primary aim of this thesis is to show how God can be first in thought as well as first among beings. In order to approach this question clearly, it is first necessary to define and divide analogy correctly. Any such discussion of analogy in St. Thomas must furthermore begin with a study of the uses of the word 'analogy' in the texts of St. Thomas. This work therefore begins with an examination of the 161 texts in which the word 'analogy' is found in the writings of St. Thomas. There are a total of 249 instances of the word found in these texts. One of the primary conclusions of this textual study is that the main technical use of the word 'analogy' has to do with analogical naming. This use seems to be in contradistinction to the use of the word 'analogy' as found in many of the Scholastics, including Cajetan. Using the fact that St. Thomas mainly speaks about 'analogy' as a kind of naming, the study then goes on to see what a definition of analogy would look like, and what its essential divisions would be. There are many statements about analogical naming and its divisions in St. Thomas, and each of these is analyzed. The result is that analogy is most clearly defined in terms of the relation between the things as defined by the accounts of the namings. Based on this definition, the most essential division of analogy would be between relations based on the per se as opposed to those based on the per accidens. These considerations are intended to lay the groundwork for speaking about how names are used of God in such a way as to pinpoint the logical implications of such action. An attempt is made to explain the statement of St. Thomas that God is somehow first in our thoughts.It will be shown that God is able to be first in thought on account of the ability of the mind to purify its concepts of creaturely content through remotion, and the fact that every concept of a created reality will be a concept of something that is a likeness of God. Furthermore, if one really comes to a knowledge of God and His perfections, one cannot help but see these perfections in Him in a way that makes His perfection the source of every created perfection, even for our understanding.

The following dissertation concerning the Trinity, as the reader ought to be informed, has been written in order to guard against the sophistries of those who disdain to begin with faith, and are deceived by a crude and perverse love of reason. Now one class of such men endeavor to transfer to things incorporeal and spiritual the ideas they have formed, whether through experience of the bodily senses, or by natural human wit and diligent quickness, or by the aid of art, from things corporeal; so as to seek to measure and conceive of the former by the latter. Aeterna Press

Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith is an intellectually rigorous and systematic account of Thomas's teaching regarding the analogy of being. Steven A. Long's work stands in contradistinction to historical-doctrinal surveys and general introductions, retrieving by way of an interpretation of Aristotle and Aquinas the indispensable role that analogy of being plays for metaphysics and, consequently, for theology. In his later writings St. Thomas did not return to questions about the analogy of being that he had answered earlier in his career. This has led most historical-textual treatments of analogy in current scholarship to the mistaken conclusion that Thomas actually changed his answers to these questions. Scholars fail to see the continuity between his treatment in the Summa theologiae and his earlier De veritate. Long's study demonstrates the coherence of St. Thomas's earlier and later analyses. It shows how Thomas's later account in the Summa theologiae necessarily presupposes his earlier teaching. This is a book that invites the reader to a demanding and speculatively intense appreciation of the metaphysics of analogy. It will contribute significantly to the growing debate on the analogy of being. "Steven A. Long's Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith is a remarkable book containing a stunning speculative performance. Long speaks for a classical tradition of Thomistic thought but does so with a keen eye on precisely the ways it can help contemporary reflection. His compelling and substantive argument for the value and truth of a set of classical metaphysical understandings--for the necessity of the analogy of proper proportionality in the thought of Thomas Aquinas--will have to be taken seriously by anyone working in analogy in Aquinas as well as by a wide range of scholars within both philosophy and theology."--John F. Boyle, University of St. Thomas

The need for another study on the doctrine of analogy in the writings ofSt Thomas may not be obvious, since a complete bibliography in this area would doubtless assume depressing proportions. The present work is felt to be justified because it attempts a full-fledged alternative to the interpretation given in Cajetan's De nominum analogia, an interpretation which has provided the framework for subsequent discussions of the question. Recently, it is true, there has been growing dissatisfaction with Cajetan's approach; indeed there have been wholesale attacks on the great commentator who is alleged to have missed the clef de voute of the metaphysics of his master. Applied to our problem, this criticism leads to the view that Cajetan was not metaphysical enough, or that he was metaphysical in the wrong way, in his discussion of the analogy of names. As its title indicates, the present study is not in agreement with Cajetan's contention that the analogy of names is a metaphysical doctrine. It is precisely a logical doctrine in the sense that "logical" has for St Thomas. We have no desire to be associated with attacks on Cajetan, the meta physician, attacks we feel are quite wrongheaded. If Cajetan must be criticized for his interpretation of the analogy of names, it is imperative that he be criticized for the right reasons. Moreover, criticism ofCajetan in the present study is limited to his views on the analogy of names.