China’s residential real estate sector plays an important role in the economy and has been a key driver of growth. Since 2014 the sector has softened visibly, reflecting overbuilding across many cities. An orderly adjustment of the sector is welcome. The key questions are how severe the adjustment will be and how long it will last. This paper uses various datasets, an analytical framework to estimate demand and supply conditions, and develops a number of scenarios to determine the oversupply both at the national level and by city tiers. It highlights that the adjustment will be a multiyear process with adverse implications for investment and growth. Smaller cities, as well as those in the Northeast region, face more challenging demand-supply dynamics. The key will be to allow the adjustment to take place, while avoiding a too sharp of an economic slowdown.

China’s real estate market rebounded sharply after a temporary slowdown in 2014-2015. This paper uses city-level data to estimate the range of house price overvaluation across city-tiers and assesses the main risks of a sharp housing market slowdown. If house prices rise further beyond “fundamental” levels and the bubble expands to smaller cities, it would increase the likelihood and costs of a sharp correction, which would weaken growth, undermine financial stability, reduce local government spending room, and spur capital outflows. Empirical analysis suggests that the increasing intensity of macroprudential policies tailored to local conditions is appropriate. The government should expand its toolkit to include additional macroprudential measures and push forward reforms to address the fundamental imbalances in the residential housing market.

This in-depth volume explains China's residential construction boom and reviews how some established trends are likely to challenge its housing market in coming years. It draws on household surveys and public data in China and provides important lessons about housing policy for China and other countries.

The sharp rise of house prices in China’s Tier-1 cities has fostered a great deal of commentary about the possibility of bubbles forming there. However, China’s unique housing market characteristics make it difficult to assess the macroeconomic severity of bursting bubbles, even if they exist. These include the setting of land supply and prices by the government, among many others. The presence of overbuilt “ghost cities” greatly complicates the ability of traditional macroeconomic policies to address these concerns. This paper looks at proposals to shore up the mortgage underwriting and legal infrastructure to help China withstand the impact of falling prices, should this occur.

This year, the NBER Macroeconomics Annual celebrates its thirtieth volume. The first two papers examine China’s macroeconomic development. “Trends and Cycles in China's Macroeconomy” by Chun Chang, Kaiji Chen, Daniel F. Waggoner, and Tao Zha outlines the key characteristics of growth and business cycles in China. “Demystifying the Chinese Housing Boom” by Hanming Fang, Quanlin Gu, Wei Xiong, and Li-An Zhou constructs a new house price index, showing that Chinese house prices have grown by ten percent per year over the past decade. The third paper, “External and Public Debt Crises” by Cristina Arellano, Andrew Atkeson, and Mark Wright, asks why there appear to be large differences across countries and subnational jurisdictions in the effect of rising public debts on economic outcomes. The fourth, “Networks and the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Exploration” by Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, and William Kerr, explains how the network structure of the US economy propagates the effect of gross output productivity shocks across upstream and downstream sectors. The fifth and sixth papers investigate the usefulness of surveys of household’s beliefs for understanding economic phenomena. “Expectations and Investment,” by Nicola Gennaioli, Yueran Ma, and Andrei Shleifer, demonstrates that a chief financial officer's expectations of a firm's future earnings growth is related to both the planned and actual future investment of that firm. “Declining Desire to Work and Downward Trends in Unemployment and Participation” by Regis Barnichon and Andrew Figura shows that an increasing number of prime-age Americans who are not in the labor force report no desire to work and that this decline accelerated during the second half of the 1990s.

China’s economy has been transforming rapidly over the last 25 years. As a result, Chinese conurbations have changed remarkably, with cities expanding both vertically and horizontally, and the physical environment acting as a medium for unprecedented urbanization. This has provided vast opportunities for investors, real estate developers, and service companies, but also presents huge challenges—as traditional city spaces have been reconfigured, environmental risks and the volatility of real estate markets increased. However, as engagement with China is becoming strategically important for many, forming a synthesized lens through which to read China across the vicissitudes of its real estate sector bears historic significance. By offering an insightful framework and structure for understanding China’s variegated real estate dynamics, players, and markets, Understanding China’s Real Estate Markets codifies the principles and practices of real estate development, finance, and investment in China and builds foundations for future academic research and practical knowledge in shaping and engaging the urban environment within China and beyond.

In this paper we analyze the fundamental drivers of China’s residential investment as a share of its GDP. Our analysis indicates that the economic structural changes that led to rebalancing toward consumption were the key driver of the rising residential investment to GDP ratio in China. We project that residential investment would moderate from the current level of 9 percent of GDP to around 6 percent by 2024, and its contribution to real GDP growth would decline gradually from currently about half percent of GDP to slightly negative over this period, barring policy intervention. The decline in the growth contribution of residential investment reflects the projected somewhat slower pace of rebalancing going forward and the envisaged increases in labor costs due to demographic changes.