This volume addresses issues in epistemology, ethics and political philosophy. It contains new papers on issues such as semantic theory of truth, sandwich theory of knowledge, American pragmatism and scepticism, arguments from ignorance, infallibilism and fallibilism, justification and confirmation, Tarski’s T-schema, experimental results and ordinary truth, epistemic comparativism and experiments, epiphenomenlism and eliminativism about the mental, the identity theory of truth, thoughts and facts, metaontological maximalism and minimalism, morality and rights, aggregation of value judgements and aggregation of preferences, conditional and unconditional ethics, the role of the theory of evolution in moral epistemology, global and international political community, Rawls' views on cosmopolitanism and global justice, international distributive justice. Contributors are: Tomasz Bigaj, Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Tadeusz Buksiński, Robin Cameron, Jan B. Deręgowski, Nigel Dower, Adam Grobler, Jesper Kallestrup, Adrian Kuźniar, Justyna Miklaszewska, Joanna Miksa, Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Katarzyna Paprzycka, Krzysztof Posłajko, Wlodek Rabinowicz, John Skorupski, Leslie Stevenson, Piotr Szałek, Tadeusz Szubka, Joseph Ulatowski, Jan Woleński, Rafał Wonicki, Anna Wójtowicz, Renata Ziemińska

This book offers a comparative analysis of the theories of justice developed by Rawls, Sen and Nussbaum, and aims to demonstrate their mutual relationship. All three liberal theories significantly enrich the set of fundamental principles of morality that concerns the sphere of political action. The novelty of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach in comparison with Rawls is that they discuss the problem of social justice on a global scale. They do not try to extend and adjust the two principles of justice to the whole of mankind, nor do they treat the difference principle as to be applied everywhere. Instead, they present their own cosmopolitan approach to applying their theories of justice to take into account issues which are neglected or insufficiently developed by Rawls, such as global inequalities, discrimination against women, the rights of people with disabilities, and animal rights. These theories can be described as an alternative to the crucial objection towards Rawls’ work that this theory of justice does not address these important global problems.

The relatively new movement of Experimental Philosophy applies different systematic experimental methods to further illuminate classical philosophical issues. This book brings together experts from the field to give the reader a compact yet extensive overview, offering a ready at hand introduction to the state of the art.

Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs, rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that beliefs do not exist. He shows us we should rather say that beliefs exist, but they are not real. Poslajko demonstrates how we might make sense of this idea by providing a unified account of the debates in philosophical psychology. The antirealist view interprets beliefs as being causally irrelevant, that they do not constitute a natural kind, and that their content cannot be naturalized. Exploring the status of folk psychology, Poslajko raises key questions in the analytic metaphysics of mind: Are beliefs real? Do people really possess mental states which are causally efficacious bearers of propositional content? By arguing for the antirealist view and revising our common-sense view about the nature of mind, he makes a compelling case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with questions about belief.

The book provides a historical (with an outline of the history of the concept of truth from antiquity to our time) and systematic exposition of the semantic theory of truth formulated by Alfred Tarski in the 1930s. This theory became famous very soon and inspired logicians and philosophers. It has two different, but interconnected aspects: formal-logical and philosophical. The book deals with both, but it is intended mostly as a philosophical monograph. It explains Tarski’s motivation and presents discussions about his ideas (pro and contra) as well as points out various applications of the semantic theory of truth to philosophical problems (truth-criteria, realism and anti-realism, future contingents or the concept of correspondence between language and reality).

Building on the seminal work of Kit Fine in the 1980s, Leon Horsten here develops a new theory of arbitrary entities. He connects this theory to issues and debates in metaphysics, logic, and contemporary philosophy of mathematics, investigating the relation between specific and arbitrary objects and between specific and arbitrary systems of objects. His book shows how this innovative theory is highly applicable to problems in the philosophy of arithmetic, and explores in particular how arbitrary objects can engage with the nineteenth-century concept of variable mathematical quantities, how they are relevant for debates around mathematical structuralism, and how they can help our understanding of the concept of random variables in statistics. This fully worked through theory will open up new avenues within philosophy of mathematics, bringing in the work of other philosophers such as Saul Kripke, and providing new insights into the development of the foundations of mathematics from the eighteenth century to the present day.

This is a collection of new investigations and discoveries on the history of a great tradition, the Lvov-Warsaw School of logic and mathematics, by the best specialists from all over the world. The papers range from historical considerations to new philosophical, logical and mathematical developments of this impressive School, including applications to Computer Science, Mathematics, Metalogic, Scientific and Analytic Philosophy, Theory of Models and Linguistics.