Considering the history of unconventional warfare in the United States, and specifically, during the Civil War, it begs the question: Did the Confederacy’s strategy to engage in unconventional warfare significantly contribute to its conventional strategy? Two assertions remain most accepted by historians and military personnel. The first prevailing opinion is that the Confederacy’s use of unconventional warfare was ineffective and negatively affected the overall campaign. The second opinion is that the South’s unconventional efforts yielded unparalleled success and prolonged the war. To evaluate the impact of the Confederacy’s unconventional campaign plan, the methodology of this study addresses several subordinate questions: Did the Confederacy adopt an unconventional war strategy as part of its overall strategy? How did conventional military leaders apply unconventional warfare? What effects did unconventional warfare have on conventional operations? Was unconventional warfare at the tactical level linked to operational and strategic level objectives?

The Upper South—Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Virginia—was the scene of the most destructive war ever fought on American soil. Contending armies swept across the region from the outset of the Civil War until its end, marking their passage at Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Perryville, and Manassas. Alongside this much-studied conflict, the Confederacy also waged an irregular war, based on nineteenth-century principles of unconventional warfare. In The Uncivil War, Robert R. Mackey outlines the Southern strategy of waging war across an entire region, measures the Northern response, and explains the outcome. Complex military issues shaped both the Confederate irregular war and the Union response. Through detailed accounts of Rebel guerrilla, partisan, and raider activities, Mackey strips away romanticized notions of how the “shadow war” was fought, proving instead that irregular warfare was an integral part of Confederate strategy.

Considering the history of unconventional warfare in the United States, and specifically during the Civil War, it begs the question: Did the Confederacy's strategy to engage in unconventional warfare significantly contribute to its conventional strategy? Two assertions remain most accepted by historians and military personnel. The first prevailing opinion is that the Confederacy's use of unconventional warfare was ineffective and negatively affected the overall campaign. The second opinion is that the South's unconventional efforts yielded unparalleled success and prolonged the war. To evaluate the impact of the Confederacy's unconventional campaign plan, the methodology of this study addresses several subordinate questions: Did the Confederacy adopt an unconventional war strategy as part of its overall strategy? How did conventional military leaders apply unconventional warfare? What effects did unconventional warfare have on conventional operations? Was unconventional warfare at the tactical level linked to operational and strategic level objectives?

Important military lessons for fighting today's insurgency in Iraq

Considering the history of unconventional warfare in the United States, and specifically during the Civil War, it begs the question: Did the Confederacy's strategy to engage in unconventional warfare significantly contribute to its conventional strategy? Two assertions remain most accepted by historians and military personnel. The first prevailing opinion is that the Confederacy's use of unconventional warfare was ineffective and negatively affected the overall campaign. The second opinion is that the South's unconventional efforts yielded unparalleled success and prolonged the war. To evaluate the impact of the Confederacy's unconventional campaign plan, the methodology of this study addresses several subordinate questions: Did the Confederacy adopt an unconventional war strategy as part of its overall strategy? How did conventional military leaders apply unconventional warfare? What effects did unconventional warfare have on conventional operations? Was unconventional warfare at the tactical level linked to operational and strategic level objectives?

Throughout the Civil War, irregular warfare—including the use of hit-and-run assaults, ambushes, and raiding tactics—thrived in localized guerrilla fights within the Border States and the Confederate South. The Guerrilla Hunters offers a comprehensive overview of the tactics, motives, and actors in these conflicts, from the Confederate-authorized Partisan Rangers, a military force directed to spy on, harass, and steal from Union forces, to men like John Gatewood, who deserted the Confederate army in favor of targeting Tennessee civilians believed to be in sympathy with the Union. With a foreword by Kenneth W. Noe and an afterword by Daniel E. Sutherland, this collection represents an impressive array of the foremost experts on guerrilla fighting in the Civil War. Providing new interpretations of this long-misconstrued aspect of warfare, these scholars go beyond the conventional battlefield to examine the stories of irregular combatants across all theaters of the Civil War, bringing geographic breadth to what is often treated as local and regional history. The Guerrilla Hunters shows that instances of unorthodox combat, once thought isolated and infrequent, were numerous, and many clashes defy easy categorization. Novel methodological approaches and a staggering diversity of research and topics allow this volume to support multiple areas for debate and discovery within this growing field of Civil War scholarship.

While the Civil War is famous for epic battles involving massive armies engaged in conventional warfare, A Savage Conflict is the first work to treat guerrilla warfare as critical to understanding the course and outcome of the Civil War. Daniel Sutherland argues that irregular warfare took a large toll on the Confederate war effort by weakening support for state and national governments and diminishing the trust citizens had in their officials to protect them.