Overview of the UN Weapons inspectors, role and inspection process.

The war against Iraq divided opinion throughout the world and generated a maelstrom of spin and counterspin. The man at the eye of the storm, and arguably the only key player to emerge from it with his integrity intact, was Hans Blix, head of the UN weapons inspection team. This is Dr. Blix’s account of what really happened during the months leading up to the declaration of war in March 2003. In riveting descriptions of his meetings with Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Kofi Annan, he conveys the frustrations, the tensions, the pressure and the drama as the clock ticked toward the fateful hour. In the process, he asks the vital questions about the war: Was it inevitable? Why couldn’t the U.S. and UK get the backing of the other member states of the UN Security Council? Did Iraq have weapons of mass destruction? What does the situation in Iraq teach us about the propriety and efficacy of policies of preemptive attack and unilateral action? Free of the agendas of politicians and ideologues, Blix is the plainspoken, measured voice of reason in the cacophony of debate about Iraq. His assessment of what happened is invaluable in trying to understand both what brought us to the present state of affairs and what we can learn as we try to move toward peace and security in the world after Iraq.

This book describes the problems encountered by UN inspection teams assigned to find and destroy Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile capabilities following Desert Storm. Kathleen C. Bailey focuses on the initial inspections—the period in which Iraq was struggling to camouflage and conceal its weapons and production equipment as inspectors were trying to define their role in the process. Working from interviews with these initial inspectors, Bailey extracts important lessons for future verification efforts. On-site arms control inspectors in Iraq found information to be carefully controlled by the government. Pertinent documentation was destroyed, only selected people were allowed to interact with inspectors, and officials refused to make full, complete declarations. Buildings were tom down, equipment was moved, and un-exploded ordnance was placed in the way. These and other techniques helped Iraq to hide its past activities and to preserve some of its weapons capabilities. In the future, arms control inspectors will need to develop strategies for dealing more effectively with recalcitrant inspectees and for creating the best possible procedures and processes. Bailey concludes with concrete suggestions for overcoming some of these obstacles with more effective inspection practices.

"Former U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter analyzes the overall strategy of the Bush presidency - national security through global domination - and the "Big Lie" he used to sell his brand of frontier justice to the world."--BOOK JACKET.

The Iran nuclear deal was a crowning moment of international diplomacy, allowing the world to step away from the edge of a self-created abyss. Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from this agreement threatens to return the world to that precipice. Dealbreaker recounts how this deal was made, why it was broken, and what the consequences of that action could be. When the United States made the decision in the 1980s to deny Iran access to nuclear technology, Iran was forced to turn to the black market to get the material, technology and know-how required to meet its need for nuclear power generation, inclusive of the ability to indigenously produce nuclear fuel. The revelation of Iran’s secret nuclear program in 2002 set in motion a battle of wills between the Iranians, who viewed nuclear power as their inherent right, and the rest of the world, who feared the proliferation implications of allowing Iran access to technology that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. The United States and its ally, Israel, pulled no punches, using diplomatic pressure to impose crippling economic sanctions, and covert activities to sow disinformation, sabotage equipment and murder Iranian nuclear scientists in an effort to stop the Iranian nuclear program from going forward. Iran prevailed, confronting the United States with the choice of either going to war, or accepting the reality of an Iranian nuclear program. The Iranian nuclear deal was the result. But the deal had an Achilles heel—the disinformation campaign waged by the United States and Israel to paint the Iranian program as military in nature left a residue of uncertainty and fear that the detractors of the deal used to attack it as little more than a sham. Donald Trump decried the Iranian nuclear deal as a “failed agreement” and promised to tear it up if he were elected President. Trump prevailed in the election, and ended up being as good as his word, pulling America out of the Iranian nuclear deal on May 12, 2018. Dealbreaker explores the nuances of the Iranian nuclear program, exposing the duplicity and hypocrisy of American diplomacy, supported by Israel and abetted by Europe, that led to the need for the Iranian nuclear deal and eventually caused the demise of an agreement that was simultaneously “the deal of the century” and fatally flawed.

U.N. inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs resumed in November 2002 after a 4-year hiatus. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 granted Iraq a final chance to disarm. Given Iraq's history of thwarting WMD inspections, many have low expectations for the success of inspections. This report, which will be updated, analyzes the challenges and opportunities of inspections in light of new U.N. Security Council authorities and Congress's authorization to use U.S. force against Iraq (P.L. 107-243). The success of these inspections will have a direct impact on whether U.S. military force is used to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. On the plus side, new inspections have strengthened authorities under the new U.N. resolution, including unimpeded access to all sites and interviewing Iraqi officials privately, and they utilize new technologies. There is also a better relationship between U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) than there was between its predecessor and the IAEA. Inspections, rather than military strikes, could encourage defectors to provide critical information and might facilitate uncovering links between WMD and terrorism. Inspections conducted under the threat of military strikes have likely increased the pressure on Iraq to comply. On the negative side, inspectors face new practical, technical, and political challenges. New regulations for sharing intelligence and inspector recruitment may hinder inspections and Iraq has had four years to potentially hide weapons activities in dual-use facilities. The threat of war could increase pressure on inspectors to produce some definitive knowledge and could potentially politicize their investigations.

After 12 years of debate, U.N. sanctions against Iraq remain controversial. The sanctions aim to ensure that Iraq does not acquire or develop biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, while also providing for Iraq's humanitarian needs. The sanctions are based on three interrelated elements -- controlling Iraq's oil revenues, screening and monitoring its imports, and inspecting for weapons. The sanctions attempt to address Iraq's humanitarian needs through a U.N. program allowing Iraq to sell oil to purchase civilian goods and through a new U.N. resolution taking effect on 5/30/02, that facilitates Iraq's purchases. This report examines: U.N. challenges in implementing the sanctions, and the elements of the new resolution that could make sanctions more effective. Ill.