Volume 107 of Terrorism, "U.N. Response to Al Qaeda", guides researchers through the history of one set of sanctions against those two organizations, sanctions based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267. In addition to the pertinent U.N. resolutions, this volume presents EU implementing regulations and court cases challenging those regulations. The expert commentary from new Co-Editor Kristen Boon highlights the human rights implications of placing a given person on the list of parties whose assets must be frozen under 1267.

This is the first book to explore the concept of 'Grotian Moments'. Named for Hugo Grotius, whose masterpiece De jure belli ac pacis helped marshal in the modern system of international law, Grotian Moments are transformative developments that generate the unique conditions for accelerated formation of customary international law. In periods of fundamental change, whether by technological advances, the commission of new forms of crimes against humanity, or the development of new means of warfare or terrorism, customary international law may form much more rapidly and with less state practice than is normally the case to keep up with the pace of developments. The book examines the historic underpinnings of the Grotian Moment concept, provides a theoretical framework for testing its existence and application, and analyzes six case studies of potential Grotian Moments: Nuremberg, the continental shelf, space law, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Tadic decision, the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

In this paper, Michael Schmitt explores the legality of the attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the "jus ad bellum," that component of international law that governs when a State may resort to force as an instrument of national policy. Although States have conducted military counterterrorist operations in the past, the scale and scope of Operation Enduring Freedom may signal a sea change in strategies to defend against terrorism. This paper explores the normative limit on counterterrorist operations. Specifically, under what circumstances can a victim State react forcibly to an act of terrorism? Against whom? When? With what degree of severity? And for how long? The author contends that the attacks against Al Qaeda were legitimate exercises of the rights of individual and collective defense. They were necessary and proportional, and once the Taliban refused to comply with U.S. and United Nations demands to turn over the terrorists located in Afghanistan, it was legally appropriate for coalition forces to enter the country for the purpose of ending the ongoing Al Qaeda terrorist campaign. However, the attacks on the Taliban were less well grounded in traditional understandings of international law. Although the Taliban were clearly in violation of their legal obligation not to allow their territory to be used as a terrorist sanctuary, the author suggests that the degree and nature of the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda may not have been such that the September 11 attacks could be attributed to the Taliban, thereby disallowing strikes against them in self-defense under traditional understandings of international law. Were the attacks, therefore, illegal? Not necessarily. Over the past half-century the international community's understanding of the international law governing the use of force by States has been continuously evolving. The author presents criteria likely to drive future assessments of the legality of counterterrorist operatio7.

Jimmy Gurulé knows how to bankrupt terrorists like few others do. As Undersecretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, he spearheaded the fight against al-Qaeda s global bank accounts, helping to earn the highest grade awarded on the 9/11 Commissioners report card. As an author, he performs once again. Unfunding Terror provides policymakers and laymen alike a clear roadmap on how to keep terrorists out of the global financial system. Timothy J. Roemer, Center for National Policy, former US Congressman and member of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) Jimmy Gurulé has given us a superbly comprehensive and well-written assessment of why, regarding terrorism, Deep Throat s principle is bang on: follow the money. R. James Woolsey, venture partner, VantagePoint, and former Director of Central Intelligence, US A detailed study by a true scholar-practitioner, Unfunding Terror explains the legal response to terror finance in language accessible to both the expert and layman. Required reading. Matthew Levitt, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, US Professor Gurulé is comprehensive: he describes the problem (terrorist funding by those in the free world), analyzes the legal responses (make it a crime, freeze terrorist assets, impose regulations on financial institutions), critiques the administration s and international community s efforts to unfund terrorists (political rhetoric, not in fact backed up with effective strategies or implementation), and outlines concrete legal and administrative remedies. Would that they to whom the recommendations are addressed act on them quickly. Too much is at stake to let terrorists, who condemn the West as corrupt, get their funding to attack the US and its allies from the West itself. That would be a form of social suicide. G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School, US The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of 2,973 innocent civilians required as much as $500,000 to stage. At the time, al Qaeda was operating on an annual budget of between $30 and $50 million. However, despite the obvious fact that terrorists need money to terrorize, preventing the financing of terrorism was not a priority for the United States or the international community prior to 9/11. Jimmy Gurulé, former Under Secretary for Enforcement in the US Department of the Treasury, provides the first book-length, comprehensive analysis of the legal regime that evolved following the terrorist attacks. The book begins with a discussion of how shutting down the pipelines of funding is as important as dismantling the terrorist cells themselves. Next, the book covers the various means and methods used by terrorist groups to raise money, and examines how money is transferred globally to finance their lethal activities. The principal components of the legal strategy to disrupt the financing of terrorism are then discussed and evaluated. Unfortunately, the author concludes that the legal regime has met with mixed results, and finds that the sense of urgency to deprive terrorists of funding that existed following 9/11 has since dissipated. As a result, international efforts to freeze terrorist assets have dramatically declined. Moreover, the US Department of Justice has suffered several embarrassing and disappointing legal defeats in prosecuting major terrorist financiers. The author provides numerous recommendations to Congress, the Executive Branch, and the UN Security Council for strengthening the legal regime to deny terrorists the money needed to wage global jihad, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and launch another terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11. Unfunding Terror fills an important gap in the literature and will be essential reading for counter-terrorism experts, law enforcement and national se

This book examines the application of UN Security Council’s mandatory sanctions since 1946, and, in particular, the regimes adopted for specific types of conflict. It addresses four distinct threats to peace and security: interstate conflicts, intrastate conflicts, norm-breaking states and terrorism.

Examines the leadership, ideology, tactics, and finances of Al Qaeda, discusses how the organization trains fighters, and outlines the international response that will be necessary to destroy the organization.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Examines terrorists¿ involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and mfg. illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. There are 3 parts: (1) Compares the criminality of internat. jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. (2) Six case studies of crimes includes trial transcripts, official reports, previous scholarship, and interviews with law enforce. officials and former terrorists are used to explore skills that made crimes possible; or events and lack of skill that the prevented crimes. Includes brief bio. of the terrorists along with descriptions of their org., strategies, and plots. (3) Analysis of the themes in closing arguments of the transcripts in Part 2. Illus.