The war in Afghanistan came to an end in 2014 after nearly thirteen years of conflict. Throughout that period, British officials have described UK operations there in various conflicting and often contradictory ways; as a counter-terrorism mission, a stabilisation mission, and a counter-narcotics mission, respectively. This book investigates how the war was ’sold’ to the British public and how Britain’s ’transnational’ foreign and defence policy impacted on the unfolding of UK strategy in Afghanistan and the way it was communicated. It argues that because the UK’s foreign and defence policy is transnationally-oriented - meaning that it is foundationally aimed at maintaining alliance with the United States and the institutional coherence of NATO - UK strategy is contingent upon collective security and, crucially, is fundamentally concerned with the means of policy (maintaining alliances) over the ends (using alliances to effect change). Explaining the inalienability of collective security systems to national security is no easy task, however, and, when faced with the adversities of Afghanistan, the UK state has since 2008 instead opted to describe the significance of Afghanistan in narrow, nation-centric, counter-terrorist concerns in order to maintain public support for collective security operations there whilst, paradoxically, framing the conflict in a manner that avoids talking about the transnational structure and purpose of the mission. This kind of ’strategic’ communication is increasingly becoming a focus of the UK state as it faces a transnational dilemma of maintaining its collective security bonds whilst facing a public increasingly sceptical of liberal interventionism.

This book investigates how the war in Afghanistan was ‘sold’ to the British public and how Britain’s ‘transnational’ foreign and defence policy impacted on the unfolding of UK strategy in Afghanistan and the way it was communicated. This kind of ‘strategic’ communication is increasingly becoming a focus of the UK state as it faces a transnational dilemma of maintaining its collective security bonds whilst facing a public increasingly sceptical of liberal interventionism.

Compelling narratives are integral to successful foreign policy, military strategy, and international relations. Yet often narrative is conceived so broadly it can be hard to identify. The formation of strategic narratives is informed by the stories governments think their people tell, rather than those they actually tell. This book examines the stories told by a broad cross-section of British society about their country’s past, present, and future role in war, using in-depth interviews with 67 diverse citizens. It brings to the fore the voices of ordinary people in ways typically absent in public opinion research. Always at War complements a significant body of quantitative research into British attitudes to war, and presents an alternative case in a field dominated by US public opinion research. Rather than perceiving distinct periods between war and peace, British citizens see their nation as so frequently involved in conflict that they consider the country to be continuously at war. At present, public opinion appears to be a stronger constraint on Western defense policy than ever.

This book applies strategic culture concepts to violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in a comparative analysis. In recent years, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has become notorious for kidnapping Western hostages in north-western Africa and for its role in the short-lived Islamist takeover of Mali. The group, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, rebranded itself as an Al-Qaida franchise in 2007, leading to speculation of a change from its Algeria-centric agenda to an anti-Western one. This study compares and contrasts the ideas and behaviour of these two groups, using a strategic-cultural approach, and finds that, despite some commonalities, AQIM has a distinct strategic culture from Al-Qaida central, thereby debunking the notion of Al-Qaida as a monolithic movement. This is the first comparative analysis of violent non-state actors to employ a strategic-cultural approach and the first such study on AQIM. While strategic culture has traditionally been applied to states, this work adds to the emerging literature applying such approaches to non-state armed groups, and employs a novel conception of strategic culture consisting of narratives and practices. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic culture, political violence, Middle Eastern politics and Security Studies in general.

This timely book offers a world history of insurgencies and of counterinsurgency warfare. Jeremy Black moves beyond the conventional Western-centric narrative, arguing that it is crucial to ground contemporary experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq in a global framework. Unlike other studies that begin with the American and French revolutions, this book reaches back to antiquity to trace the pre-modern origins of war within states. Interweaving thematic and chronological narratives, Black probes the enduring linkages between beliefs, events, and people on the one hand and changes over time on the other hand. He shows the extent to which power politics, technologies, and ideologies have evolved, creating new parameters and paradigms that have framed both governmental and public views. Tracing insurgencies ranging from China to Africa to Latin America, Black highlights the widely differing military and political dimensions of each conflict. He weighs how, and why, lessons were “learned” or, rather, asserted, in both insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. At every stage, he considers lessons learned by contemporaries, the ways in which norms developed within militaries and societies, and their impact on doctrine and policy. His sweeping study of insurrectionary warfare and its counterinsurgency counterpart will be essential reading for all students of military history.

A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.

A detailed new account of the British military campaign in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, based on the experiences of those who served. On 11 September 2001 19 al-Qaeda-inspired jihadists hijacked four aircraft and mounted the deadliest terrorist attack in history. The outrage triggered a chain of events that saw British forces drawn into a lengthy military campaign against a fierce insurgency in Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that obligated military assistance to the United States. The British government supported the initial US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and subsequently committed troops to Kabul and northern Afghanistan from 2002 onwards. However, in January 2006, following NATO's expansion southwards, Britain committed a battlegroup from the Parachute Regiment to Helmand Province in what became known as Operation Herrick, with Defence Secretary John Reid stating he 'would be perfectly happy to leave in three years and without firing one shot'. The reality was very different. From 2006 to 2014, a succession of British task forces rotated through Helmand and fought against an implacable enemy. When they finally withdrew in 2014, British forces had suffered losses of more than 450 killed and 2,000 wounded. The Taliban were not defeated and would grow stronger. Sergio Miller served in Defence Intelligence in Whitehall throughout the campaign, and Pride and Fall answers the many questions surrounding the conflict. Based on abundant open-source material generated by the war and first-hand testimonies, this is the story of the men and women who served.