How does financial deregulation affect the operation of the banking system in the UK? What are the consequences of the development of an electronic banking system? This book addresses these and other important questions in a survey of UK change in the financial sector and in banking in particular. Attention is given to the role of building societies after the 'big bang' and the implications for retail banking of competition in the housing finance market. Both the long and short term implications of regulatory reform for banks are dealt with together with the role of the Bank of England and what the changes have meant in terms of international banking. Concentrating on the three main areas of change deregulation, regulatory reform and technical innovation the book is an important pointer to the shape of banking in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

How does financial deregulation affect the operation of the banking system in the UK? What are the consequences of the development of an electronic banking system? This book addresses these and other important questions in a survey of UK change in the financial sector and in banking in particular. Attention is given to the role of building societies after the ‘big bang’ and the implications for retail banking of competition in the housing finance market. Both the long and short term implications of regulatory reform for banks are dealt with together with the role of the Bank of England and what the changes have meant in terms of international banking. Concentrating on the three main areas of change deregulation, regulatory reform and technical innovation the book is an important pointer to the shape of banking in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

How does financial deregulation affect the operation of the banking system in the UK? What are the consequences of the development of an electronic banking system? This book addresses these and other important questions in a survey of UK change in the financial sector and in banking in particular. Attention is given to the role of building societies after the 'big bang' and the implications for retail banking of competition in the housing finance market. Both the long and short term implications of regulatory reform for banks are dealt with together with the role of the Bank of England and what the changes have meant in terms of international banking. Concentrating on the three main areas of change deregulation, regulatory reform and technical innovation the book is an important pointer to the shape of banking in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Dalvinder Singh provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the legal aspects of prudential supervision. This gives the reader a broader understanding of the core processes of banking supervision. By using the UK as a case study, a comparison is made with the US to illustrate the different ways of approaching the issues. The author examines the legal as well as the theoretical, economic, political and policy issues that underpin the purpose of prudential supervision, such as corporate governance, enforcement sanctions, the role of external auditors and accountability of financial regulators. These are considered in the context of broad-policy considerations which render prudential supervision necessary, namely financial stability and depositor protection. The book will be of interest to academics, policymakers, regulators and practitioners, and equally will serve specialist undergraduate and postgraduate programmes in law, management and economics which focus on financial regulation.

Fishman examines the international economic development and domestic political considerations that, in 1986, encouraged the reforms of the financial markets and the implementation of a new regulatory structure.

Shows how the politics of banking crises has been transformed by the growing 'great expectations' among middle class voters that governments should protect their wealth.

Financial regulation is often framed as a question of economic efficiency. This paper, by contrast, puts the distributive implications of financial regulation center stage. We develop a model in which the financial sector benefits from risk-taking by earning greater expected returns. However, risktaking also increases the incidence of large losses that lead to credit crunches and impose negative externalities on the real economy. We describe a Pareto frontier along which different levels of risktaking map into different levels of welfare for the two parties. A regulator has to trade off efficiency in the financial sector, which is aided by deregulation, against efficiency in the real economy, which is aided by tighter regulation and a more stable supply of credit. We also show that financial innovation, asymmetric compensation schemes, concentration in the banking system, and bailout expectations enable or encourage greater risk-taking and allocate greater surplus to the financial sector at the expense of the rest of the economy.