Since NATO's establishment in 1949, the cost of providing for the collective protection of the alliance was to "be shared equitably among the member countries." This report provides a historical presentation of defense burden sharing. Determines the status of U.S. burden sharing initiatives proposed to NATO allies since 1980 and the allies' responsiveness to those initiatives, (2) the allies' record in meeting their military commitments, and (3) the effect of future force reductions on defense burden sharing. Charts and tables.

This study establishes that the political, economic and military-technological changes that transform the international system also alter the way in which a state views its and others' responsibilities and burdens for responding to international crises. It assesses the distribution of the costs of raising and supporting arms of service, the risks of deploying them overseas and using them in combat or peace operations, and the extent to which members have a responsibility for maintaining international order in the context of three instances of multinational military intervention: the Multinational Force deployment in Lebanon in 1982-83; the first Persian Gulf War in 1990-91; and the UN and NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The NATO Allies agreed at the September 2014 Wales Summit to spend at least two percent of their gross domestic products (GDPs) on defense by 2024. This commitment has become a point of contention among the Allies and a distraction from the imperative of improving the Alliance's burden sharing system. The GDP-based burden sharing policy has not proven to be effective or fair, and its implementation has been subject to national political and economic constraints. NATO as a whole has struggled to sufficiently fund the capabilities necessary for its mission effectiveness, even as individual Allies (above all, the United States) have spent enormous amounts on defense. At the same time, some Allies have made significant security contributions

This book, first published in 1983, analyses the debate around burden-sharing in NATO, where the main issue is the distribution amongst the allies of the burden of maintaining the security arrangement. This raises problems of defining, measuring and comparing the defence efforts of the various countries. This book examines the issues, and argues for the need to address directly the fundamental problems concerning the Cold War security relationship between the United States and Western Europe.

Since the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), US administrations have criticized their European allies for not meeting security burden-sharing goals. This study aims to gain insight into what factors motivate alliance members to contribute to the burden-sharing objectives they have agreed to achieve. From a US perspective, the need for its European allies to reach these goals will allow the United States to shift resources to more pressing strategic challenges like the rise of China. Informed by Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action and Glenn Snyder’s concept of the security dilemma in alliances, this project tests the hypothesis that the more a NATO ally’s foreign policy interests align with those of the United States, the less that ally will spend on defense as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This study uses a mixed-methods approach. The primary metric measuring an ally’s contribution is the percentage of its GDP spent on defense. Furthermore, this study breaks NATO’s history into three geopolitical periods: the Cold War (1950 to 1990), the Post-Cold War (1991 to 2006), and the Resurgent period (2007 to 2019). The analysis yields robust support for the theory in periods lacking a major threat (i.e., the Post-Cold War). That means the more aligned an ally’s foreign policy preferences are with the United States, the less that ally spends on defense as a percentage of its GDP in such periods. The implications of these findings suggest that with the intensified threat of Russia made apparent with its attack on Ukraine in 2022, burden sharing in the NATO alliance will be less of a problem for the US in the immediate future. However, when this threat recedes, the burden-sharing issue will return, and the United States will have to send credible signals (like withdrawing troops from Europe) to its allies to cause them to question US protection and increase defense spending.