This volume is the first of two addressing the legal regime governing the use of force during armed conflicts. Traditionally labeled 'Hague Law', today the norms it examines are commonly referred to as 'conduct of hostilities rules'. At the heart of this body of law is the principle of distinction, which requires that civilians and civilian objects be distinguished from combatants and military objectives during military operations. It is the purest expression of the foundational balance between humanitarian considerations and military necessity that has underpinned international humanitarian law since its inception. The essays selected consider the theoretical and practical difficulties of maintaining the balance in the face of evolving means and methods of warfare and competing perspectives as to how it is best achieved. Also addressed is the law governing warfare at sea and in the air. Essays focusing on the former examine early norms and analyze their continuing relevance to today's maritime operations whilst those exploring the latter inject much needed clarity into the subject, an essential task in light of the centrality of aerial warfare in modern combat operations.

In 1914, the armies and navies that faced each other were alike right down to the strengths of their companies and battalions and the designs of their battleships and cruisers. Differences were of degree rather than essence. During the interwar period, however, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in exploitation by the seven major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technology and weapons and incorporated them into their doctrine, organisation and styles of operations.

This book argues that President Warren Harding and his secretary of navy, Edwin Denby exercised unusual foresight in preparing the navy for a war against Japan. This revised edition adds new evidence from original documents provides invaluable details and insights into the lasting legacy of the Harding administration.