Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

On March 10, 2023, U.S. regulators shut down Silicon Valley Bank after a run on its deposits. Several other banks, including Signature Bank, Credit Suisse, and First Republic Bank, had to be bought or shut down in the following weeks. This collection of articles from some of the world’s top economists, written and published as events unfolded, explore the reasons for the 2023 banking crisis, the failure of regulators and politicians to prevent this moment, and how governments and banks must reform their policies to prevent similar crises in the future.

Using aggregate and bank level data for several countries, the paper studies what happens to the banking system in the aftermath of a banking crisis. Contemporary crises are not accompanied by declines in aggregate bank deposits, and credit does not fall relative to output, although the growth of both deposits and credit slows down substantially. Output recovery begins in the second year after the crisis and is not led by a resumption in credit growth. Banks, including the stronger ones, reallocate their asset portfolio away from loans.

What are the long-term causes and consequences of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008? This book offers a fresh perspective on these issues by bringing together a range of academics from law, history, economics and business to look in more depth at the changing relationships between crises and complexity in the US and UK financial markets. The contributors are motivated by three main questions: • Is the present financial system more complex than in the past and, if so, why? • To what extent, and in what ways, does the worldwide financial crisis of 2007–2008 differ from past financial crises? • How can governments, regulators and businesses better manage and deal with increased levels of complexity both in the present and in the future? Students and scholars of finance, economics, history, financial law, banking and international business will find this book to be of interest. It will also be of use to regulators and policymakers involved in the US and UK banking sectors.

Specialists in various aspects of the Japanese financial industry describe, analyze, and evaluate the crisis that began with bursting real east bubbles in the early 1990s and resulting non-performing loans, delay by regulatory authorities and the banks themselves, a decompressive deregulation in 1996, major reforms in 1998 and early 1999 that made $500 billion of government funds available, and the resulting lack of regulatory control. In the context of the transition from a bank-centered and relationship-based system to market-based and competitive, they investigate why the banks got into such serious trouble, why the Ministry of Finance lost its immense power, how financial regulation will further change the industry and the huge government financial institutions and postal savings, and what some broader implications are of the transitions. Most of the 12 studies are revised from presentations at an October 1998 conference in New York. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The global financial system has proven increasingly unstable and crisis-prone since the early 1980s. The system has failed to serve either creditors or debtors well. This has been reinforced by the global financial crisis of 2008, where we have seen systemic weaknesses bring rich countries to the brink of bankruptcy and visit appalling suffering on the poorest citizens of poor countries. Yet the regulatory responses to this crisis have involved little thinking from outside the box in which the crisis was delivered to the world. This book presents a powerful indictment of this regulatory failure and calls for greatly increased attention to international financial law and analyses new regulatory measures with the potential to make a new recognition of the principles that ought to underlie it. Using a historical approach that compares the various financial crises of the past three decades, the authors clearly show how misconceived economic policy responses have paved the way for each next 'crash'. Among the numerous topics that arise in the course of this revealing analysis are the following: overvalued exchange rates; excess liquidity in rich countries; premature liberalisation of local financial markets; capital controls; derivatives markets; accounting standards; credit ratings and the conflicts in the role of credit rating agencies; investor protection arrangements; insurance companies; and payment, clearing and settlement activities. The authors offer detailed commentary on: the role of multilateral development banks, the IMF and the WTO in responding to crises; the role of the Basel Accords, the Financial Stability Forum and Board, and the responses of the European Commission, the US, and the G20 to the most recent crisis. The book concludes by exploring systemic game-changing reforms such as bank levies, financial activities taxes and financial transaction taxes, and a global sovereign bankruptcy regime; as well as measures to remove the currency mismatches from the balance sheets of developing countries. Apart from its great usefulness as a detailed introduction to the international financial system and its regulation, the book is enormously valuable for its clear identification of the areas of regulatory failure, and its analysis of new regulatory approaches that offer the potential for a genuinely more stable system. Banking and investment policymakers at every level, the lawyers that serve these markets and the regulators that seek to regulate them, cannot afford to neglect this book.