Turkish-Iranian cooperation has visibly intensified in recent years, thanks in part to Turkish energy needs and Iran's vast oil and natural gas resources. However, Turkey and Iran tend to be rivals rather than close partners. While they may share certain economic and security interests, especially regarding the Kurdish issue, their interests are at odds in many areas across the Middle East. Turkey's support for the opposition in Syria, Iran's only true state ally in the Middle East, is one example. Iraq has also become a field of growing competition between Turkey and Iran. Iran's nuclear program has been a source of strain and divergence in U.S.-Turkish relations. However, the differences between the United States and Turkey regarding Iran's nuclear program are largely over tactics, not strategic goals. Turkey's main fear is that Iran's acquisition of nuclear arms could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. This, in turn, could increase pressure on the Turkish government to consider developing its own nuclear weapon capability. U.S. and Turkish interests have become more convergent since the onset of the Syrian crisis. However, while U.S. and Turkish interests in the Middle East closely overlap, they are not identical. Thus, the United States should not expect Turkey to follow its policy toward Iran unconditionally. Turkey has enforced United Nations sanctions against Iran but, given Ankara's close energy ties to Tehran, may be reluctant to undertake the harshest measures against Iran.

This book explores the complexity of the Syrian question and its effects on the foreign policies of Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The Syrian crisis has had a major effect on the regional order in the Middle East. Syria has become a territory where the rivalry between Russia and Western powers is being played out, and with the West’s gradual withdrawal, the conflict will without a doubt have lasting effects locally and on the international order. This collection focuses on the effects of the Syrian crisis on the new governance of the Middle East region by three political regimes: Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Many articles and a number of books have been written on this conflict, which has lasted over ten years, but no publication has examined simultaneously and comparatively how these three states are participating in the shared management of the Syrian conflict.

This volume examines contemporary political relations between Turkey and the Middle East. In the light of the Arab Uprisings of 2011, the Syria Crisis, the escalation of regional terrorism and the military coup attempt in Turkey, it illustrates the dramatic fluctuations in Turkish foreign policy towards key Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The contributors analyze Turkey’s deepening involvement in Middle Eastern regional affairs, also addressing issues such as terrorism, social and political movements and minority rights struggles. While these problems have traditionally been regarded as domestic matters, this book highlights their increasingly regional dimension and the implications for the foreign affairs of Turkey and countries in the Middle East.

This book narrates how Turkey and Qatar have come to forge a mutually special relationship. The book argues that throughout the 2000s Turkey and Qatar had pursued similar foreign policies and aligned their positions on many critical and controversial issues. By doing so, however, they increasingly isolated themselves in the Middle East as states challenging the status quo. The claim made here is that it is this isolation—which became acute in the summer of 2013—that led the two countries to forge much stronger relations.

This book examines domestic and regional geopolitical dynamics behind Turkish-Qatari relations from the past to the present. Utilizing arguments of practical geopolitical reasoning, Özgür Pala and Khaled Al-Jaber situate their analysis of evolving relations in the contexts of Ottoman-British geopolitical rivalry in the Persian Gulf, the Turkish Republic’s fluctuating relations with the Middle East until the 2000s, the AKP governments’ opening to the region and finally the Arab Spring and its aftermath. Contextualizing the trajectory of Turkish-Qatari relations within the larger Middle East and the Gulf Arab region, the authors argue that material interests and identity politics have generally determined relations until the turn of the millennium. Under Erdogan and Sheikh Hamad’s assertive leadership and ambitious foreign policy, Turkey and Qatar came to witness various foreign policy convergences on critically important regional issues. Pala and Al-Jaber argue that these convergences, coupled with their geopolitical and security goals, facilitated a political alignment between Ankara and Doha throughout the Arab Spring. They argue that despite facing major geopolitical setbacks, Turkey and Qatar were able to chart a much deeper cooperation, which later evolved into a strategic partnership in various areas.

Turkey and Iran tend to be rivals rather than close partners, despite sharing certain economic and security interests. For instance, Turkey supports the opposition in Syria, while Iran supports the regime. Turkey is further concerned about a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East. U.S. and Turkish interests in the region closely overlap, but the United States should not expect Turkey to follow its policy toward Iran unconditionally.

This book explores the diplomatic, security and energy relations of Turkey and Iran, analysing the impact of religious, political and social transformation on their bilateral relationship. It examines Turkey and Iran’s security relations with the wider Middle East - including the Kurdish-Turkish War, the Kurdish-Iranian War and the Kurdish-Arab War - and their impact on regional politics.