In the context of debates about truth, nihilism is the view that nothing is true. This is a very striking and (at first) implausible thesis, which is perhaps why it is seldom discussed. Truth without Truths applies nihilism to the philosophical debates on truth and paradox, and explores how a nihilist approach to truth is a serious contender. David Liggins demonstrates that a strong case for nihilism about truth is available. The main grounds for taking nihilism on truth seriously are the solutions it provides to a wide range of paradoxes involving truth, and its epistemological superiority to theories that posit truths. The discussion considers a wider range of paradoxes than usual-including the truth-teller paradox and other paradoxes of underdetermination. Liggins shows how the debate over truth and paradox can be advanced by drawing on metaphysical debates about realism and anti-realism. Truth without Truths is also a challenge to deflationism. Deflationists provide an austere, metaphysically lightweight account of truth. But there is one posit that all contemporary deflationists make: they posit truths. By showing that we can well do without truths, Liggins argues that deflationism is actually too lavish a position. Liggins's preferred form of alethic nihilism includes a Ramseyan analysis of the concept of truth, which uses quantification into sentence position, conceived of as non-objectual and non-substitutional. This book is part of a wider movement exploring the implications of admitting forms of non-objectual, non-substitutional quantification-sometimes called 'higher-order metaphysics'.

Mark Jago offers a new metaphysical account of truth. He argues that to be true is to be made true by the existence of a suitable worldly entity. Truth arises as a relation between a proposition - the content of our sayings, thoughts, beliefs, and so on - and an entity (or entities) in the world.

An anthology of 40 texts and interviews written over 20 years by French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, of which the early texts belong to literary criticism. Philosophy clearly dominates the rest of the book with a surprise admission by Deleuze that Sartre was his master.

Ian Schrager, Marcus Aurelius, Supreme, Kith, Rick Rubin, Kanye West, Soulcycle, Ikea, Sweetgreen, The Wu-Tang Clan, Danny Meyer, Tracy Chapman, Warren Buffett, Walt Disney, Jack's Wife Freda, Starbucks, A24, Picasso, In-N-Out Burger, intel, Tom Brady, Mission Chinese, Nike, Masayoshi Takayama, Oprah, the Baal Shem Tov. What do they all have in common? They have discovered their purpose and unlocked their creative potential. We have been born into a time when all the tools to make our dreams a reality are available and, for the most part, affordable. We have the freedom to manifest our truth, pursue our own path, and along the way discover our best selves. Whether as individuals or as part of a group, we can't be held back by anything except knowledge. The Age of Ideas provides that knowledge. It takes the reader on an incredible journey into a world of self-discovery, personal fulfillment, and modern entrepreneurship. The book starts by explaining how the world has shifted into this new paradigm and then outlines a step-by-step framework to turn your inner purpose and ideas into an empowered existence. Your ideas have more power than ever before, and when you understand how to manifest and share those ideas, you will be on the road to making an impact in ways you never before imagined. Welcome to the Age of Ideas.

This collection brings together in translation the finest postwar German-language scholarship on Nietzsche's philosophy, ranging over his concept of irony, his thoughts on music, his relation to the pre-Socratics, his concept of truth, and numerous other topics. Many of the essays appear in English here for the first time, and all are newly translated for the volume.

Hartry Field presents a selection of thirteen essays on a set of related topics at the foundations of philosophy; one essay is previously unpublished, and eight are accompanied by substantial new postscripts.Five of the essays are primarily about truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes, five are primarily about semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of 'factual defectiveness' in our discourse, and three are primarily about issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. The essays on truth, meaning, and the attitudes show a development from a form of correspondence theory of truth and meaning to a more deflationist perspective.The next set of papers argue that a place must be made in semantics for the idea that there are questions about which there is no fact of the matter, and address the difficulties involved in making sense of this, both within a correspondence theory of truth and meaning, and within a deflationary theory. Two papers argue that there are questions in mathematics about which there is no fact of the mattter, and draw out implications of this for the nature of mathematics. And the final paper arguesfor a view of epistemology in which it is not a purely fact-stating enterprise.This influential work by a key figure in contemporary philosophy will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.

What does it mean to be truthful? What role does truth play in our lives? What do we lose if we reject truthfulness? No philosopher is better suited to answer these questions than Bernard Williams. Writing with his characteristic combination of passion and elegant simplicity, he explores the value of truth and finds it to be both less and more than we might imagine. Modern culture exhibits two attitudes toward truth: suspicion of being deceived (no one wants to be fooled) and skepticism that objective truth exists at all (no one wants to be naive). This tension between a demand for truthfulness and the doubt that there is any truth to be found is not an abstract paradox. It has political consequences and signals a danger that our intellectual activities, particularly in the humanities, may tear themselves to pieces. Williams's approach, in the tradition of Nietzsche's genealogy, blends philosophy, history, and a fictional account of how the human concern with truth might have arisen. Without denying that we should worry about the contingency of much that we take for granted, he defends truth as an intellectual objective and a cultural value. He identifies two basic virtues of truth, Accuracy and Sincerity, the first of which aims at finding out the truth and the second at telling it. He describes different psychological and social forms that these virtues have taken and asks what ideas can make best sense of them today. Truth and Truthfulness presents a powerful challenge to the fashionable belief that truth has no value, but equally to the traditional faith that its value guarantees itself. Bernard Williams shows us that when we lose a sense of the value of truth, we lose a lot both politically and personally, and may well lose everything.