Dated May 2011. The reports published as HC 651 (ISBN 9780215556232); HC 688 (ISBN 9780215556363); HC 721 (ISBN 9780215556424); HC 687 (ISBN 9780215556530); HC 667 (ISBN 9780215556646); HC 668 (ISBN 9780215556745); HC 741 (ISBN 9780215556851); HC 765 (ISBN 9780215556882)

The Commons Public Accounts Committee publishes its 61st Report of the Session which, on the basis of evidence from the Cabinet Office and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), examined tax disputes. At 31 March 2011 HM Revenue & Customs was seeking to resolve tax issues valued at over £25 billion with large companies, some of which included disputes over outstanding tax. In this report, the Committee expresses concern about how the Department handled some cases involving large settlements and that there needs to be proper separation between the negotiation of tax settlements and the authorization of such settlements. The Committee also states that HMRC made matters worse by trying to avoid scrutiny of these settlements, keeping confidential the details of specific settlements with large companies. This effects Parliament's ability to establish value for money, compounded further by imprecise, inconsistent and potentially misleading answers given by senior departmental officials, including the Permanent Secretary for Tax in particular over his evidence on his relationship with Goldman Sachs, in facilitating a settlement with the company over their tax dispute. HMRC governance processes in these matters were inconsistent and it has now appointed two new Commissioners with tax expertise, and plans to introduce a new assessor role to permit independent review of large settlements before they are finalised. The Committee further states that it saw little evidence of personal accountability within the Department, and that a perception has developed that large companies are treated more favourably, receiving preferential treatment compared to small businesses and individuals.

work of committees In 2008-09 : Second report of session 2009-10, report, together with formal minutes and Appendices

At a time when education is considered crucial to a country’s economic success, recent UK governments have insisted their reforms are the only way to make England’s system world class. Yet pupils are tested rather than educated, teachers bullied rather than trusted and parents cast as winners or losers in a gamble for school places. Education under siege considers the English education system as it is and as it might be. In a highly accessible style, Peter Mortimore, an author with wide experience of the education sector, both in the UK and abroad, identifies the current system’s strengths and weaknesses. He concludes that England has some of the best teachers in the world but one of the most muddled systems. Challenging the government’s view that there is no alternative, he proposes radical changes to help all schools become good schools. They include a system of schools receiving a fair balance of pupils who learn easily and those who do not, ensuring a more even spread of effective teachers, as well as banning league tables, outlawing selection, opening up faith schools and integrating private schools into the state system. In the final chapter, he asks readers who share his concerns to demand that the politicians alter course. The book will appeal to parents, education students and teachers, as well as everyone interested in the future education of our children.

This report examines the risks and rewards for private equity investors in government private finance projects. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) model has been used by governments in some 700 projects over the last 20 years but defects, including failures to demonstrate the value for money case satisfactorily, the use of long inflexible contracts and the costly contracting process, and inefficient pricing of equity have made continuing with the current model unsustainable. The Treasury is currently reviewing the PFI model. It needs to improve flexibility in the way that private finance is used, establishing quicker and more efficient procurement procedures and achieving a better balance between investors' risks and their rewards. Private finance should only be used where it secures real value for money for the taxpayer, not because of definitional statistical incentives to get projects off the balance sheet (only some 20% of long term PFI liabilities are recorded as debt in the national accounts). Business cases must be an unbiased and transparent assessment of the best form of procurement for the particular project being undertaken, taking account of expected tax receipts from alternative options and not adjusting assumptions to bias the outcome of the assessment. The Treasury needs to collect data on investors' experiences and use this information to assess and challenge investors' returns. There needs to be greater transparency over the pricing of contracts, and inefficiencies which add to the cost of private deals, such as long procurement times, need to be addressed.

The run on deposits at Northern Rock in September 2007 was one of the key moments in a financial crisis. After nationalising Northern Rock in February 2008, the Treasury eventually decided to split out a new retail bank, ("Northern Rock plc"), for sale, and to run-down the majority of the mortgage assets in a separate public sector vehicle, Northern Rock (Asset Management) plc ("NRAM"). Northern Rock plc was sold to Virgin Money in 2011 for proceeds currently estimated at £931 million, an expected loss of £469 million. The Treasury hopes to recover all the public funds provided to Northern Rock but this is far from certain as it relies on a profitable wind-down of NRAM. Moreover there will still be an economic loss, currently estimated at £2 billion. The Treasury took too long to nationalise the bank and failed to make an effective challenge to the bank's business plan. The Treasury has started to address this lack of capacity: it has established UK Financial Investments ("UKFI") with a small team of 12 people to manage the taxpayer shares in banks. The £66 billion cash spent purchasing shares in RBS and Lloyds may never be recovered. In hindsight, the Treasury's decision to create and sell a new bank turned out to be no worse than any available alternative, because no matter which part of the bank was sold, or when, a larger amount of assets would need to be retained in public ownership.

This report examines the Crown Estate Commissioner's management of the Crown property, rights and interests which make up the Crown Estate in Scotland. The Commissioner's operations in Scotland can be split into two categories: ancient possessions/responsibilities and modern activities relating to the buying, selling and management of property and land. The evidence identified major issues, particularly in relation to the seabed and the foreshore: including lack of accountability, lack of communication and consultation with local communities, the inappropriateness of the Commissioner's remit for its responsibilities in the marine environment, the cash leakage from local economies and other adverse impacts. There were no such problems in relation to the management of urban and rural estate. The Commissioner's responsibilities for the seabed, the foreshore and other ancient rights in Scotland should be devolved then decentralized as far as possible. Devolution to Holyrood should be conditional upon agreement between the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Scottish Government on how such a scheme of subsidiarity to local authority and local community levels should be implemented. This report also sets out how different arrangements could be made for each of the Scottish Crown property rights and responsibilities. Further consultation should proceed on the basis of proposals set out by the Highlands and Islands local authorities, which provides a clear framework on which to base discussion.