The EU and the US responded to the global financial crisis by changing the rules for the functioning of financial services and markets and by establishing new oversight bodies. With the US Dodd–Frank Act and numerous EU regulations and directives now in place, this book provides a timely and thoughtful explanation of the key elements of the new regimes in both regions, of the political processes which shaped their content and of their practical impact. Insights from areas such as economics, political science and financial history elucidate the significance of the reforms. Australia's resilience during the financial crisis, which contrasted sharply with the severe problems that were experienced in the EU and the US, is also examined. The comparison between the performances of these major economies in a period of such extreme stress tells us much about the complex regulatory and economic ecosystems of which financial markets are a part.

Analysing the emerging international legal framework governing financial institutions and markets, including monetary policies and monetary regulation, this book addresses the cross border issues that arise within this area. It highlights the lack of formal international law present, and shows how this contributed to the global financial crisis.

Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.

The global financial crisis that began in 2007 was the most destructive since the 1930s. The rapid spread of the crisis across borders and the complexity of these cross-border linkages highlighted the importance for authorities of working together in responding to the crisis. This book examines the transnational response that relied heavily on a set of relatively informal transnational regulatory groupings that had been constructed over previous decades. During the crisis these arrangements were made stronger and more inclusive, but they remain very complex. Thousands of pages of new rules have been created by various transnational bodies, and the implementation of these rules relies heavily on domestic law and regulation and private rules and practices. This book analyses this complex response, showing that its overly technical and incremental character, the persistence of tensions between transnational processes and state-centred politics, and the ongoing power of private actors, have made the regulatory response fall short of what is needed. Transnational Financial Regulation after the Crisis provides new insights that are relevant for theory and practice, not only for transnational financial regulation, but for global governance more generally.

We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.

The 2008 crash was the worst financial crisis and the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression. It triggered a complete overhaul of the global regulatory environment, ushering in a stream of new rules and laws to combat the perceived weakness of the financial system. While the global economy came back from the brink, the continuing effects of the crisis include increasing economic inequality and political polarization. After the Crash is an innovative analysis of the crisis and its ongoing influence on the global regulatory, financial, and political landscape, with timely discussions of the key issues for our economic future. It brings together a range of experts and practitioners, including Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner; former congressman Barney Frank; former treasury secretary Jacob Lew; Paul Tucker, a former deputy governor of the Bank of England; and Steve Cutler, general counsel of JP Morgan Chase during the financial crisis. Each poses crucial questions: What were the origins of the crisis? How effective were international and domestic regulatory responses? Have we addressed the roots of the crisis through reform and regulation? Are our financial systems and the global economy better able to withstand another crash? After the Crash is vital reading as both a retrospective on the last crisis and an analysis of possible sources of the next one.

The global credit crisis of 2008 2009 was the most serious shock to the world economy in fully 80 years. It was for the world as a whole what the Asian crisis of 1997 1998 was for emerging markets: a profoundly alarming wake-up call. By laying bare the fragility of global markets, it raised troubling questions about the operation of our deeply integrated world economy. It cast doubt on the efficacy of the dominant mode of light-touch financial regulation and more generally on the efficacy of the prevailing commitment to economic and financial liberalization. It challenged the managerial capacity of inherited institutions of global governance. And it augured a changing of the guard, pointing to the possibility that the economies that had been the leaders in the "global growth stakes" in the past might no longer be the leaders in the future. What the crisis means for reform, however, is still unclear. This book brings together leading scholars and policy analysts to describe and weigh the options. Successive chapters assess options for the global financial system, the global trading system, the international monetary system, and the Group of 20 and global governance. A final set of chapters contemplates the policy challenges for emerging markets and the advanced economies in the wake of the financial crisis.