In Buying Military Transformation, Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz analyze the United States military's ongoing effort to capitalize on information technology. New ideas about military doctrine derived from comparisons to Internet Age business practices can be implemented only if the military buys technologically innovative weapons systems. Buying Military Transformation examines how political and military leaders work with the defense industry to develop the small ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, advanced communications equipment, and systems-of-systems integration that will enable the new military format. Dombrowski and Gholz's analysis integrates the political relationship between the defense industry and Congress, the bureaucratic relationship between the firms and the military services, and the technical capabilities of different types of businesses. Many government officials and analysts believe that only entrepreneurial start-up firms or leaders in commercial information technology markets can produce the new, network-oriented military equipment. But Dombrowski and Gholz find that the existing defense industry will be best able to lead military-technology development, even for equipment modeled on the civilian Internet. The U.S. government is already spending billions of dollars each year on its "military transformation" program-money that could be easily misdirected and wasted if policymakers spend it on the wrong projects or work with the wrong firms. In addition to this practical implication, Buying Military Transformation offers key lessons for the theory of "Revolutions in Military Affairs." A series of military analysts have argued that major social and economic changes, like the shift from the Agricultural Age to the Industrial Age, inherently force related changes in the military. Buying Military Transformation undermines this technologically determinist claim: commercial innovation does not directly determine military innovation; instead, political leadership and military organizations choose the trajectory of defense investment. Militaries should invest in new technology in response to strategic threats and military leaders' professional judgments about the equipment needed to improve military effectiveness. Commercial technological progress by itself does not generate an imperative for military transformation. Clear, cogent, and engaging, Buying Military Transformation is essential reading for journalists, legislators, policymakers, and scholars.

Although DOD has made progress toward establishing a management framework for overall business transformation, the framework currently focuses on business systems modernization and does not fully address broader business transformation efforts. In 2005, DOD set up the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to review and approve the business enterprise architecture a transformation blueprint and new business systems modernization investments. It also established the Business Transformation Agency, which currently reports to the Vice Chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to coordinate and lead business transformation across the department. Despite these steps, DOD has not clearly defined or institutionalized interrelationships, roles and responsibilities, or accountability for establishing a management framework for overall business transformation. For example, differences of opinion exist within DOD about the roles of various senior leadership committees. Until DOD's business transformation management framework is institutionalized and encompasses broad responsibilities for all aspects of business transformation, it will be challenging for DOD to integrate related initiatives into a sustainable, enterprise-wide approach to successfully resolve weaknesses in business operations that GAO has shown are at high risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.

Donald Rumsfeld¿s vision of a transformed U.S. military has been discussed by many and understood by few, and this lack of understanding has resulted in both significant simplifications and sweeping generalizations. If Rumsfeld¿s Transformation is indeed dead, does this mean that Transformation as a greater process is dead as well? This report discusses the answers to this question, which requires one to understand first that ¿Rumsfeld¿s Transformation Vision (RTV)¿ is the result of multiple influences that predate his time in office. Second, RTV is actually an umbrella term for 3 different things: a new way of war, a process, and a defense strategy. And third, the military services shaped, and at times limited, the effectiveness of his program. Illus.

Transforming the Defense Department : exploring the merits of the proposed National Security Personnel System : hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, April 29, 2003.

The Department of Defense (DOD) considers the transformation1 of the U.S. military a strategic imperative to meet the security challenges of the new century. In October 1998, DOD established a joint concept development and experimentation program to provide the engine of change for this transformation. The U.S. Joint Forces Command, the executive agent of the program, carries out experiments-with support from the military services, the combatant commands, and other DOD organizations-to explore and analyze new joint operational and organizational concepts. The experiments can include studies and analyses, conferences, workshops, seminars, war games, and simulated or live field experiments. On the basis of these experiments, the Joint Forces Command recommends changes aimed at achieving significant improvements in joint capabilities. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council2 reviews the Command's recommendations, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for approving them. The Council also oversees the implementation of approved recommendations. The cumulative changes are expected to contribute to the way U.S. military forces are transformed. In November 2001, DOD also created an Office of Force Transformation to foster innovation and experimentation and assist the Secretary of Defense to develop guidance and identify strategies and policies for transformation. Because of the central role DOD's joint experimentation program plays in military transformation, we reviewed related activities to determine whether changes are needed to improve the program's ability to focus on future joint operations, military transformation, and the rapid integration of results.