This piece of work began life as a doctoral thesis written at the University of Texas between 1976 and 1978. Now after a year in Dublin it is to become a book. Of the many people in the Department of Linguistics at Texas who shaped my interests and who helped me through the writing of the thesis, I must single out Lee Baker, Lauri Karttunen, Bill Ladusaw, Sue Schmerling and Stanley Peters for special gratitude. All of them have provided specific suggestions which have improved this work, but perhaps more .importantly they provided a uniquely stimulating and harmonious environment in which to work, and a demanding set of professional standards to live up to. To Ken Hale lowe a particular debt of gratitude - for two years of encour agement and suggestions, and particularly for a set of detailed comments on an earlier version of the book which led to many changes for the better. I also thank my friends Per-Kristian Halvorsen and Elisabet Engdahl, both of whom took the trouble to provide me with detailed criticisms and comments. In Dublin I am grateful to the School of Celtic Studies of the Institute for Advanced Studies for giving me the opportunity of teaching a seminar on many of the topics covered in the book and of exposing the material to people whose knowledge of the language is unequalled. Donal 6 Baoill and Liam Breatnach have been particularly helpful.

The most general goal of this book is to propose and illustrate a program of research in word semantics that combines some of the methodology and results in linguistic semantics, primarily that of the generative semantics school, with the rigorously formalized syntactic and semantic framework for the analysis of natural languages developed by Richard Montague and his associates, a framework in which truth and denotation with respect to a model are taken as the fundamental semantic notions. I hope to show, both from the linguist's and the philosopher's point of view, not only why this synthesis can be undertaken but also why it will be useful to pursue it. On the one hand, the linguists' decompositions of word meanings into more primitive parts are by themselves inherently incomplete, in that they deal only in distinctions in meaning without providing an account of what mean ings really are. Not only can these analyses be made complete by a model theoretic semantics, but also such an account of these analyses renders them more exact and more readily testable than they could ever be otherwise.

No detailed description available for "Syntactic Structures".

In this book we hope to acquaint the reader with the fundamentals of truth conditional model-theoretic semantics, and in particular with a version of this developed by Richard Montague in a series of papers published during the 1960's and early 1970's. In many ways the paper 'The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English' (commonly abbreviated PTQ) represents the culmination of Montague's efforts to apply the techniques developed within mathematical logic to the semantics of natural languages, and indeed it is the system outlined there that people generally have in mind when they refer to "Montague Grammar". (We prefer the term "Montague Semantics" inasmuch as a grammar, as conceived of in current linguistics, would contain at least a phonological component, a morphological component, and other subsystems which are either lacking entirely or present only in a very rudi mentary state in the PTQ system. ) Montague's work has attracted increasing attention in recent years among linguists and philosophers since it offers the hope that semantics can be characterized with the same formal rigor and explicitness that transformational approaches have brought to syntax. Whether this hope can be fully realized remains to be seen, but it is clear nonetheless that Montague semantics has already established itself as a productive para digm, leading to new areas of inquiry and suggesting new ways of conceiving of theories of natural language. Unfortunately, Montague's papers are tersely written and very difficult to follow unless one has a considerable background in logical semantics.