In recent years transaction cost economics have come to dominate the discussion of the nature and organization of firms. In Transaction Costs Economics and Beyond Michael Dietrich offers a critical exploration of transaction costs. He argues that whilst they have much to offer, they are still an inadequate basis for a general theory of the firm. Drawing on theories of organizational behaviour as well as economics, he concludes by offering a theory of the firm that allows for both hierarchical and creative decision making.

Transaction cost economics has and continues to be a fruitful area of research. There is still much to be done in the field with past research being used in conjunction with the vast number of contractual phenomena that have yet to be investigated in transaction cost economics terms. New challenges are posed by the need to move beyond the design of new contractual instruments (such as financial derivatives) to include an examination of the lurking hazards that attend contract implementation.

Transaction cost economics began to take shape around 1970 and has since been established as an essential tool used to illuminate a wide range of problems in economics and other social sciences. This reader presents articles which together form the foundations of research in transaction cost economics.

Adopting a critical realist position, this book renders transaction cost economics (TCE) into a behavioral theory of organizational decision-making by foregrounding psychological processes and introducing and integrating with effectuation theory. Consistent with its behavioral agenda, the book introduces the concept of uncertainty controllability and provides a clearer conceptualization and a novel modeling strategy of bounded rationality based on the conceptual separation of cognitive bounds from psychological ‘rationalizing.’ The book inspires new insights into the significance of cultural distance (CD). Based on the understanding that culture is socially-extended cognition, the author re-conceptualizes CD as reflecting cognitive bounds, and uses the biases arising from CD to contextualize effectuation and deepen the flat ontology of both TCE and effectuation theory. The book presents a full two-sided behavioral framework of organizational decision-making, with behavioral TCE and behavioral real options theory complementing each other to complete the full behavioral picture. Both sides are further linked to organizational learning, which reduces biases over time and thus drives governance structures toward more rational directions. The full framework uses prospect theory as the overarching theory that determines which side of the behavioral framework is relevant for the uncertainty of concern based on the different problem frames resulting from different degrees of uncertainty controllability. Because effectuation can take place on both sides of the framework based on competing risk logics, prospect theory serves to harmonize inconsistencies in the effectuation literature as a side note. This book applies the behavioral TCE side of the framework to the study of MNC subsidiary ownership decision-making process using a dataset of over 10,000 Japanese subsidiaries founded in 43 host countries. It concludes with a discussion of implications and future directions for TCE in general and international business in particular.

'Not too long ago it was possible to be familiar with all of the important works and latest developments in transaction cost economics. That that is no longer the case is a testament to the intellectual appeal and empirical success of the transaction cost approach. for newcomers, the entries in this volume, by some of TCE's most knowledgeable and eloquent contributors, offer an excellent introduction to the issues, methods, discoveries, and debates in the field; for veterans, the volume provides a highly valuable resource for catching up on the newest research.' - Scott E. Masten, University of Michigan School of Business, US

In modern economies a substantial proportion of resources is increasingly allocated to transaction costs. An improvement in the definition of transaction costs to include both the information role and efficiency role requires an integration of the approaches of positive economics and normative economics. In The Economics of Transaction Costs P.K.Rao provides a comprehensive analytical treatment of the subject and suggests a few directions for formal economic models.

This book brings together a collection of seven papers on Transaction Cost Economics by Nobel Laureate Professor Oliver E Williamson. The applications of Transaction Cost Economics are extensive, ranging from the field of industrial organization and applied fields of economics such as labor, public finance, comparative economic systems and economic development, to the business fields of strategy, organizational behavior, marketing, finance, operations management, and accounting. In short, as Williamson states, "any problem that originates as or can be reformulated as a contracting problem can be examined to advantage in transaction cost economizing terms." What is referred to as New Institutional Economics is developed in the West in two mainly complementary ways: Property Rights Theory, and Transaction Cost Economics. Of the two, Property Rights Theory developed more rapidly. Transaction Cost Economics has nonetheless taken shape of late. In China, research on New Institutional Economics began in the 1990s and has grown rapidly since. China has similarly given much more attention to Property Rights Theory. Gengxuan Chen, the editor of this volume, recommends that China will benefit by bringing Transaction Cost Economics to bear. Simultaneously, for scholars who study the market economy, Transaction Cost Economics provides a very attractive way to explain the practice of the Chinese market economy.