This sequel to Market Structure and Foreign Trade examines the new international trade's applied side. It provides a compact guide to models of the effects of trade policy in imperfectly competitive markets, as well as an up-to-date survey of existing knowledge, which is extended by the authors' useful interpretations of the results.

Trade flows and trade policies need to be properly quantified to describe, compare, or follow the evolution of policies between sectors or countries or over time. This is essential to ensure that policy choices are made with an appropriate knowledge of the real conditions. This practical guide introduces the main techniques of trade and trade policy data analysis. It shows how to develop the main indexes used to analyze trade flows, tariff structures, and non-tariff measures. It presents the databases needed to construct these indexes as well as the challenges faced in collecting and processing these data, such as measurement errors or aggregation bias. Written by experts with practical experience in the field, A Practical Guide to Trade Policy Analysis has been developed to contribute to enhance developing countries' capacity to analyze and implement trade policy. It offers a hands-on introduction on how to estimate the distributional effects of trade policies on welfare, in particular on inequality and poverty. The guide is aimed at government experts engaged in trade negotiations, as well as students and researchers involved in trade-related study or research. An accompanying DVD contains data sets and program command files required for the exercises. Copublished by the WTO and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.

Interest in U.S. trade policy has been stimulated in recent years by the massive American trade deficit, by the belief that intervention by foreign governments in international markets has given other countries a competitive edge over the United States, and by concern about the increase in protectionism among industrial countries. In turn, major analytical developments in international economics have revolutionized trade theory, broadening its scope both by introducing in a more formal manner such concepts as imperfect competition, increasing returns, product differentiation, and learning effects and by including the study of political and economic factors that shape trade policy decisions. This collection of papers—the result of a conference held by the NBER—applies these "new" trade theories to existing world cases and also presents complementary empirical studies that are grounded in more traditional trade theories. The volume is divided into four parts. The papers in part 1 consider the problem of imperfect competition, empirically assessing the economic effect of various trade policies introduced in industries in which the "new" trade theory seems to apply. Those in part 2 isolate the effects of protection from the influences of the many economic changes that accompany actual periods of protection and also examine how the effects from exogenous changes in economic conditions vary with the form of protection. Part 3 provides new empirical evidence on the effect of foreign production by a country's firms on the home country's exports. Finally, in part 4, two key bilateral issues are analyzed: recent U.S.-Japanese trade tensions and the incident involving the threat of the imposition of countervailing duties by the United States on Canadian softwood lumber.

The current distribution of power markets around intermediate structures that fall between the two extremes of full integration and unbundling suggests that there has not been a linear path to power market structure reform. Rather, many developing countries may retain intermediate structures into the foreseeable future. This possibility exposes a gap in the understanding of power market structures, since most theoretical work has focused on the two extreme possibilities and there is limited evidence of the impact of unbundling for developing countries. Power Market Structure takes a novel analytical approach to modeling market structure, together with ownership and regulation, in determining performance across several indicators, including access, operational and financial performance, and environmental sustainability. Its conclusions--which will be of particular interest to policy makers, academics, and development practitioners--reflect evidence drawn from statistical analysis and a representative sample of 20 case studies, selected based on initial conditions such as income and power system size. The key result of the analysis is that unbundling delivers results when used as an entry point to implementing broader reforms, particularly introducing a sound regulatory framework, and reducing the degree of concentration of the generation and distribution segments of the market by attracting additional public and private players and greater private sector participation. In addition, there seems to be a credible empirical basis for selecting a threshold power system size and per capita income level below which unbundling of the power supply chain is not expected to be worthwhile. Partial forms of vertical unbundling do not appear to drive improvements. The most likely reason is that the owner was able to continue exercising control over the affairs of the sector and hinder the development of competitive pressure within the power market.

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to the applied economic modeling of trade policies.