How can international trade agreements promote development and how can rules be designed to benefit poor countries? Can multilateral trade cooperation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) help developing countries create and strengthen institutions and regulatory regimes that will enhance the gains from trade and integration into the global economy? And should this even be done? These are questions that confront policy makers and citizens in both rich and poor countries, and they are the subject of Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation. This book analyzes how the trading system could be made more supportive of economic development, without eroding the core WTO functions.

Considers legislation to authorize U.S. membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation, an international organization for GATT administration.

A multi-disciplinary investigation of how economic globalization can help achieve the UN's 2030 Agenda, exploring trade-offs among the Goals.

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been proliferating for more than two decades, with the negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and a Trans-Pacific Partnership being just the tip of the iceberg. This volume addresses some of the most pressing issues related to the surge of these agreements. It includes chapters written by leading political scientists, economists and lawyers which theoretically and empirically advance our understanding of trade agreements. The key theme is that PTAs vary widely in terms of design. The authors provide explanations as to why we see these differences in design and whether and how these differences matter in practice. The tools for understanding the purposes and effects of PTAs that are offered will guide future research and inform practitioners and trade policy experts about progress in the scientific enquiry into PTAs.

In Cooperation among Nations, Joseph M. Grieco offers a provocative answer to a fundamental question in world politics: How does the anarchical nature of the international system inhibit the willingness of states to work together even when they share common interests? Grieco examines the capacity of two leading contemporary theories--modem political realism and the newest liberal institutionalism--to explain national responses to the non-tariff barrier codes negotiated during the Tokyo Round of international trade talks. According to his interpretation of realist theory, Grieco characterizes states as "defensive positionalists." As such, they often fail to cooperate because they fear that a joint endeavor, while producing positive gains for all participants, might also generate disparities in gains among the partners involved. Grieco demonstrates that this realist concept of defensive state positionalism gives rise to a better understanding of the systemic constraints on international collaboration and of the impact of anarchy on states than is offered by neoliberal institutionalism. Drawing on previously unreported archival materials, Grieco rigorously applies the two theories to an empirical analysis of the cooperative efforts of the United States and the European Community during the 1980s to regulate and reduce non-tariff trade barriers through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.

Intra-Industry Trade calls for us to rethink what trade most often looks like and how it shapes global institutions, fostering peace among states. Cameron G. Thies and Timothy M. Peterson argue that our understanding of trade has not kept pace with its changing nature in the 21st century; existing models, rooted in Ricardo's theories, regard trade uniformly as taking place between entities and countries that offer different commodities and operate according to the logic of comparative advantage. Though this type of exchange does take place, intra-industry trade—international trade of the same or similar commodities, in which foreign and domestic brands compete—is increasingly prevalent. The authors argue that our current academic and policymaking focus on the total volume of trade, rather than its composition, is misplaced. Trade composition matters, not just because it gives us a fuller understanding of how trade works, but also because intra-industry trade increases the likelihood of positive institutional relations and cooperation between states. To illustrate their point, the authors examine the effects that intra-industry trade has on Preferential Trade Agreement formation, its tendency to lessen World Trade Organization disputes and militarized conflict, and its ability to pave the way for new and fortified alliances.