The insolvency of sovereign debtors is a virtually timeless phenomenon and yet the existing international financial architecture does not provide any legal framework to deal with this issue. Following an overview of the main proposals as to how to bridge this gap, this study analyses the extent to which public international law can be used as a source for the establishment of a reorganisation system for sovereign debt. While there is no adequate customary international law relating to sovereign insolvencies, reference can instead be made to the growing body of general principles of law. This is illustrated by a comparison of the systems of corporate financial reorganisation in insolvency in six representatively selected countries - Argentina, England, France, Germany, Indonesia and the U.S. Due to the inherent lack of enforceability with regard to sovereign debtors, in order to be able to provide a basis for a reorganisation system for sovereign debt, these principles need to be complemented with a compliance control mechanism. This study suggests how such a system could be constructed and implemented.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

The current approach to resolving sovereign debt crises does not work: sovereign debt restructurings come too late and address too little. Though unresolved debt crises impose enormous costs on societies, many recent restructurings have not been deep enough to provide the conditions for economic recovery (as illustrated by the Greek debt restructuring of 2012). And if the debtor decides not to accept the terms demanded by the creditors, finalizing a restructuring can be slowed by legal challenges (as illustrated by the recent case of Argentina, deemed as "the trial of the century"). A fresh start for distressed debtors is a basic principle of a well-functioning market economy, yet there is no international bankruptcy framework for sovereign debts. While this problem is not new, the United Nations and the global community are now willing to do something about it. Providing guidance for those who intend to take up reform, this book assesses the relative merits of various debt-restructuring proposals, especially in relation to the main deficiencies of the current nonsystem. With contributions by leading academics and practitioners, Too Little, Too Late reflects the overwhelming consensus among specialists on the need to find workable solutions.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

This paper studies the effect of sovereign debt restructurings with external private creditors on growth during the period 1970-2010. We find that there are bad and good (or not so bad) debt restructurings for growth. While growth generally declines in the aftermath of a sovereign debt restructuring, agreements that allow countries to exit a default spell (final restructurings) are associated with improving growth. The impact can be significant. In general, three years after restructuring, growth is about 5 percent lower compared to countries that did not face restructuring over the same period. The exception is for final restructurings, which result in positive growth in the years immediately after the restructuring. Final restructurings tend to be better for growth because they reduce countries’ debt, with the strongest effect for countries that exit restructurings with relatively low debt levels.

The insolvency of states is by no means a rare or new phenomenon. Despite this, it still seems to be widely felt that states do not go bankrupt. As of yet, there are no regulated insolvency proceedings for states. This book examines the current mechanisms for solving sovereign debt crises. It presents an analysis of their weaknesses and shows possibilities for dealing with such crises in the future. In this respect, the work focusses on crisis resolution measures at European level: the aid packages for Greece, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stabilisation Facility and the European Stability Mechanism. These are examined for their appropriateness as well as whether they contain elements of insolvency law. Ultimately, it explores possible insolvency proceedings for states at EU level and their implementation options.

In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.