This paper provides an overview of key elements of Corporate Bankruptcy Codes and Practice around the world that are relevant to the debate on Sovereign Debt Restructuring. It highlights four components common to most bankruptcy reorganization institutions: a stay on debt collection efforts to prevent a costly run for the assets, broad enforcement of absolute priority, majority voting among creditors on the proposed reorganization plan, and new higher priority financing to keep the firm going while its liabilities are restructured. The paper argues that these components ought to be present in any sovereign debt restructuring procedure.

In recent years there has been extensive discussion inside and outside the IMF on the need to develop a new approach to sovereign debt restructuring. Exploring ways to improve the sovereign debt restructuring process is a key part of the international community’s efforts to strengthen the architecture of the global financial system. This pamphlet by IMF First Deputy Managing Director Anne O.Krueger draws together the latest IMF thinking on the controversial issue in a single publication.

The paper discusses key incentive-related issues of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism recently outlined by the IMF First Deputy Managing Director. The structure of incentives in the mechanism should be consistent with the principle of favoring market-oriented, voluntary solutions to financial crises. The paper frames the mechanism in the context of involving the private sector in financial crisis resolution (PSI), and identifies the conditions for setting up an appropriate incentive structure. The paper explores issues relating to the functioning of the mechanism, including access policy on IMF resources; the power to activate the mechanism; its relation with intermediate PSI instruments; and its impact on investment in emerging markets.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

The insolvency of sovereign debtors is a virtually timeless phenomenon and yet the existing international financial architecture does not provide any legal framework to deal with this issue. Following an overview of the main proposals as to how to bridge this gap, this study analyses the extent to which public international law can be used as a source for the establishment of a reorganisation system for sovereign debt. While there is no adequate customary international law relating to sovereign insolvencies, reference can instead be made to the growing body of general principles of law. This is illustrated by a comparison of the systems of corporate financial reorganisation in insolvency in six representatively selected countries - Argentina, England, France, Germany, Indonesia and the U.S. Due to the inherent lack of enforceability with regard to sovereign debtors, in order to be able to provide a basis for a reorganisation system for sovereign debt, these principles need to be complemented with a compliance control mechanism. This study suggests how such a system could be constructed and implemented.