As cyberspace continues to play an important role in projection of military power, in an environment where the mission of tomorrow is ill defined and budgets are becoming constrained, there is an increasing need for a Total Force (AC/RC) concept. The existing and emerging requirements for Army Cyber Mission Forces (CMF) are currently greater than the Army's active component has personnel available or trained to support USCYBERCOM and ARCYBER requirements. The Army's RC is uniquely postured to fill current, midterm and longer-term cyber gap requirements, but it requires planning and investment now in training, development, and integrations of the RC CMF. Although moving cautiously, some of the distinct advantages many Reserve Component (USAR and ARNG) Soldiers have are their ties to the communities, full-time employment in the civilian information technology, and their dispersion across the country. Unlike centrally consolidated Title-10 (AC and USAR) organizations, with Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities requirements with limited authorities under the Posse Comitatus Act, the ARNG units can further assist local and state governmental agencies nationwide to defend critical infrastructure networks. These aspects further make the RC uniquely postured to fill current, midterm and longer-term cyber requirements, but it requires planning and investment now in training, development, and integrations of the RC CMF. This analysis accomplishes this through inspection of policy, current requirements, constructs, mission areas and initiatives for RC forces to determine the benefits or drawbacks to successful generation of a Total Force (AC/RC) CMF.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

"As cyberspace continues to play an important role in projection of military power, in an environment where the mission of tomorrow is ill defined and budgets are becoming constrained, there is an increasing need for a Total Force (AC/RC) concept. The existing and emerging requirements for Army Cyber Mission Forces (CMF) are currently greater than the Army’s active component has personnel available or trained to support USCYBERCOM and ARCYBER requirements. The Army’s RC is uniquely postured to fill current, midterm and longer-term cyber gap requirements, but it requires planning and investment now in training, development, and integrations of the RC CMF. Although moving cautiously, some of the distinct advantages many Reserve Component (USAR and ARNG) Soldiers have are their ties to the communities, full-time employment in the civilian information technology, and their dispersion across the country. Unlike centrally consolidated Title-10 (AC and USAR) organizations, with Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities requirements with limited authorities under the Posse Comitatus Act, the ARNG units can further assist local and state governmental agencies nationwide to defend critical infrastructure networks. These aspects further make the RC uniquely postured to fill current, midterm and longer-term cyber requirements, but it requires planning and investment now in training, development, and integrations of the RC CMF. This analysis accomplishes this through inspection of policy, current requirements, constructs, mission areas and initiatives for RC forces to determine the benefits or drawbacks to successful generation of a Total Force (AC/RC) CMF"--Abstract.

Developing a skilled cyber workforce is imperative to DOD achieving its offensive and defensive missions, and in 2013 it began developing CMF teams to fulfill these missions. CYBERCOM announced that the first wave of 133 such teams achieved full operational capability in May 2018. GAO’s report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a trained CMF, (2) made plans to maintain a trained CMF, and (3) leveraged other cyber experience to meet training requirements for CMF personnel. This is an unclassified version of a For Official Use Only report that GAO previously issued. GAO is making eight recommendations, including that the Army and Air Force identify time frames for validating foundational CMF courses; the military services develop CMF training plans with specific personnel requirements; CYBERCOM develop and document a plan establishing independent assessors to evaluate training; and CYBERCOM establish the training tasks covered by foundational training courses and convey them to the services.

What capabilities can Reserve component forces bring to the Department of Defense (DoD) cyberspace forces? What opportunities and challenges surround the integration of these forces into a still-evolving joint cyberspace force? What are the expectations for cyber forces that serve in a militia capacity? This monograph explores these questions in four major sections. First, the monograph provides a concise review of basic information on the laws and policies governing the use of Reserve component forces. Second, it explores the uses of Reserve component cyber forces from a DoD perspective, focusing on the current strength and organization of Army National Guard (ARNG) and Reserve cyber forces and their use as part of the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF). It also addresses responsibilities for defense support to civil authorities and related operational issues, training and exercise opportunities, and total force challenges. Third, the monograph examines the use of ARNG cyber forces from the perspective of a state government, emphasizing the expectations of governors for state incident response and cybersecurity support. This section also addresses military-private partnerships, state-sponsored cyber ranges and exercises, and international partnerships. In the final section, the author offers recommendations to policymakers and leaders toward improving the integration and utilization of Army Reserve component cyberspace forces.

The emerging Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Mission Force includes forces from all military services that may reflect artifacts in their organization, training, and operation that are influenced by service cultures. Such diversity offers challenges and opportunities for senior leaders and policymakers entrusted with creating a joint force that can operate professionally in and through cyberspace. This monograph examines how the U.S. Army may benefit by adopting processes and practices from other service cyberspace forces to the operations of Army Cyber Command. It focuses on the central question: "What is the context in which different military services approach cyberspace component operations internally as well as with the DoD?" To address this question, the study is divided into four major sections: - First, the monograph provides a background of the mission and structure of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the tenets of current joint cyberspace operations doctrine. - Second, it explores the mission, organization, training, and equipping of each of the four service cyberspace components as well as the Coast Guard contributions. - Third, it analyzes how the service components support the USCYBERCOM mission as well as common trends and service culture influences among their operations. - Fourth, the author provides recommendations for DoD and Army leaders to consider for the enhancement of joint and service cyberspace operations.

"Cyberspace is fundamentally changing how the military conceptualizes warfare. As such, the old paradigms of personnel management that have served the USAF for so well must evolve to accommodate a new breed of warfighter. Yet, cultural biases have prevented utilization of this inherently technical rank tier which have prevented implementation of effective management practices and thus necessitates a need for flexible options now - particularly in light of legal constraints preventing actions to support recruitment and retention of cyber operators. Further, the coming October 2018 deadline for Cyber Mission Force (CMF) full operating capability (FOC) is fast approaching making this change urgent. The USAF lags significantly behind the Army and Navy who have already achieved FOC a full year ahead of schedule. The USAF needs the flexibility, particularly in the technology-rich cyber environment, that the Warrant Officer rank provides and the CMF provides the perfect change catalyst to demonstrate its utility for the rest of the force."--Abstract.

Just a sample of the contents ... contains over 2,800 total pages .... PROSPECTS FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN CYBERSPACE Cyberwarfare and Operational Art CYBER WARFARE GOVERNANCE: EVALUATION OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE OFFENSIVE USE OF CYBER Cyber Attacks and the Legal Justification for an Armed Response UNTYING OUR HANDS: RECONSIDERING CYBER AS A SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER Effects-Based Operations in the Cyber Domain Recommendations for Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense MILLENNIAL WARFARE IGNORING A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: THE NEED TO CREATE A SEPARATE BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR CYBER WARFARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER WARFARE LESSONS FROM THE FRONT: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN CYBER WARFARE ADAPTING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE TO CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF HACKTIVIST BASED INSURGENCIES Addressing Human Factors Gaps in Cyber Defense Airpower History and the Cyber Force of the Future How Organization for the Cyber Domain Outpaced Strategic Thinking and Forgot the Lessons of the Past THE COMMAND OF THE TREND: SOCIAL MEDIA AS A WEAPON IN THE INFORMATION AGE SPYING FOR THE RIGHT REASONS: CONTESTED NORMS IN CYBERSPACE AIR FORCE CYBERWORX REPORT: REMODELING AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND & CONTROL THE CYBER WAR: MAINTAINING AND CONTROLLING THE “KEY CYBER TERRAIN” OF THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN WHEN NORMS FAIL: NORTH KOREA AND CYBER AS AN ELEMENT OF STATECRAFT AN ANTIFRAGILE APPROACH TO PREPARING FOR CYBER CONFLICT AIR FORCE CYBER MISSION ASSURANCE SOURCES OF MISSION UNCERTAINTY Concurrency Attacks and Defenses Cyber Workforce Retention Airpower Lessons for an Air Force Cyber-Power Targeting ¬Theory IS BRINGING BACK WARRANT OFFICERS THE ANSWER? A LOOK AT HOW THEY COULD WORK IN THE AIR FORCE CYBER OPERATIONS CAREER FIELD NEW TOOLS FOR A NEW TERRAIN AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE CYBER ENVIRONMENT Learning to Mow Grass: IDF Adaptations to Hybrid Threats CHINA’S WAR BY OTHER MEANS: UNVEILING CHINA’S QUEST FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE THE ISLAMIC STATE’S TACTICS IN SYRIA: ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN SHIFTING A PEACEFUL ARAB SPRING INTO TERRORISM NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: THE KEY TO A MORE AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY TO COMBAT TERRORISM THOUGHTS INVADE US: LEXICAL COGNITION AND CYBERSPACE The Cyber Threat to Military Just-In-Time Logistics: Risk Mitigation and the Return to Forward Basing PROSPECTS FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN CYBERSPACE Cyberwarfare and Operational Art CYBER WARFARE GOVERNANCE: EVALUATION OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE OFFENSIVE USE OF CYBER Cyber Attacks and the Legal Justification for an Armed Response UNTYING OUR HANDS: RECONSIDERING CYBER AS A SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER Effects-Based Operations in the Cyber Domain Recommendations for Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense MILLENNIAL WARFARE IGNORING A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: THE NEED TO CREATE A SEPARATE BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR CYBER WARFARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER WARFARE LESSONS FROM THE FRONT: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN CYBER WARFARE ADAPTING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE TO CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF HACKTIVIST BASED INSURGENCIES Addressing Human Factors Gaps in Cyber Defense Airpower History and the Cyber Force of the Future How Organization for the Cyber Domain Outpaced Strategic Thinking and Forgot the Lessons of the Past THE COMMAND OF THE TREND: SOCIAL MEDIA AS A WEAPON IN THE INFORMATION AGE SPYING FOR THE RIGHT REASONS: CONTESTED NORMS IN CYBERSPACE AIR FORCE CYBERWORX REPORT: REMODELING AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND & CONTROL THE CYBER WAR: MAINTAINING AND CONTROLLING THE “KEY CYBER TERRAIN” OF THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN WHEN NORMS FAIL: NORTH KOREA AND CYBER AS AN ELEMENT OF STATECRAFT AN ANTIFRAGILE APPROACH TO PREPARING FOR CYBER CONFLICT AIR FORCE CYBER MISSION ASSURANCE SOURCES OF MISSION UNCERTAINTY Concurrency Attacks and Defenses Cyber Workforce Retention