Between the end of the Kokoda campaign in January 1943 and the start of the New Guinea offensives at Lae in early September 1943, the Australian Army was engaged in some of the most intense and challenging fighting of the war for the ridges around Salamaua. Following the defeat of the Japanese offensive against Wau, it was decided to carry the fight to the Japanese force at Salamaua but what started as platoon level actions in April and May 1943 soon developed into company, battalion and brigade level operations for control of the dominating ridge systems around Salamaua. Following an amphibious landing, an American infantry regiment and supporting artillery units were also drawn into the fighting in July 1943. Salamaua 1943 also includes detailed insights into the tenacious Japanese defence of Salamaua, a defence to a threat that in the end was only a feint to draw Japanese forces away from Lae. Incorporating over 120 photographs from the battlefield including drone footage plus 26 maps and the added detail of 15 sidebars, Salamaua 1943 takes the reader behind what was one of the most complex campaigns of the Pacific War.

This is Volume XVIII of eighteen in a series on the Sociology of Development. Originally published in 1951, this is a book about the changing culture of a New Guinea village.

The revisionist work about Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who won his battles at sea but lost the war of public opinion. A surface warrior, Fletcher led the carrier forces in the Pacific that won against all odds at Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomon’s. Despite these successes, during the post-war Fletcher had become one of the most controversial figures in U.S. naval history and was portrayed as a timid bungler who failed to relieve Wake Island and who deliberately abandoned the Marines at Guadalcanal.

This is the first book to provide a comprehensive overview of the land war during the Second World War in South-East Asia and the South and South-West Pacific. The extensive existing literature focuses on particular armies – Japanese, British, American, Australian or Indian – and/or on particular theatres – the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Malaya or Burma. This book, on the contrary, argues that warfare in all the theatres was very similar, especially the difficulties of the undeveloped terrain, and that there was considerable interchange of ideas between the allied armies which enabled the spread of best practice among them. The book considers tactics, training, technology and logistics, assesses the changing state of the combat effectiveness of the different armies, and traces the course of the war from the Japanese Blitzkrieg of 1941, through the later stalemate, and the hard fought Allied fightback. Although the book concentrates on ground forces, due attention is also given to air forces and amphibious operations. One important argument put forward by the author is that the defeat of the Japanese was not inevitable and that it was brought about by chance and considerable tactical ingenuity on the part of US and British imperial forces.