Formal economic analysis using Shackle's ideas of historical time and nonprobabilistic uncertainty

Proposes novel methods to incorporate ignorance and uncertainty into economic modeling without complex mathematics.

The standard theory of decision making under uncertainty advises the decision maker to form a statistical model linking outcomes to decisions and then to choose the optimal distribution of outcomes. This assumes that the decision maker trusts the model completely. But what should a decision maker do if the model cannot be trusted? Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, two leading macroeconomists, push the field forward as they set about answering this question. They adapt robust control techniques and apply them to economics. By using this theory to let decision makers acknowledge misspecification in economic modeling, the authors develop applications to a variety of problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Technical, rigorous, and self-contained, this book will be useful for macroeconomists who seek to improve the robustness of decision-making processes.

The need to understand the theories and applications of economic and finance risk has been clear to everyone since the financial crisis, and this collection of original essays proffers broad, high-level explanations of risk and uncertainty. The economics of risk and uncertainty is unlike most branches of economics in spanning from the individual decision-maker to the market (and indeed, social decisions), and ranging from purely theoretical analysis through individual experimentation, empirical analysis, and applied and policy decisions. It also has close and sometimes conflicting relationships with theoretical and applied statistics, and psychology. The aim of this volume is to provide an overview of diverse aspects of this field, ranging from classical and foundational work through current developments. - Presents coherent summaries of risk and uncertainty that inform major areas in economics and finance - Divides coverage between theoretical, empirical, and experimental findings - Makes the economics of risk and uncertainty accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

New Keynesian Economics has been the most significant development in economics in recent years. However, many modern thinkers have asked whether it actually builds upon or merely distorts Keynes' work. This unique volume provides the first full-scale critique of the New Keynesian school of thought. Within its pages, Post-Keynesian economists, including many from the United States, challenge New Keynesianism both on the grounds that it is not Keynesian, and does not provide an adequate account of our current economic problems. Sure to provoke much new debate and even controversy, New Keynesian Economicsseeks to reconcile these two seemingly intractable systems.

The New Keynesian Economics has been the most significant development in economics in recent years. Does it actually build upon Keynes' work? In this volume, leading post Keynesian economists challenge New Keynesianism both on the grounds that it is not Keynesian, and does not provide an adequate account of our current economic problems.

I have three reasons for bringing out the ensuing collection of essays. First, since analysis without measurement (this is generally not the same thing as what is commonly referred to as "qualitative methods" or "qualitative research" in the social science literature) is a relatively new scholarly endeavor, I am striving to enhance its visibility by attracting a wider audience than what would normally be possible with single, narrowly-focused essays published in scat tered journals. Second, several of these essays may, in the minds of potential readers, appear to have been published in places that, if not obscure, are at least inconvenient to locate. Collecting them in a single anthology, then, will help to increase their accessibility. Third, I am trying to suggest, as strongly as I can, that analysis without measurement is a viable intellectual enterprise that ought to be taken seriously in social science. This last point will clearly be en hanced if the whole that follows turns out, as I hope and suspect it does, to be greater than the sum of its parts. All the same, each reader will have to judge for himself or herself the extent to which I have, through the present collection, successfully made the case for taking up analysis without measurement. The partitioning of these essays into two groups is somewhat, though by no means completely arbitrary.