This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.

Collectively, mankind has never had it so good despite periodic economic crises of which the current sub-prime crisis is merely the latest example. Much of this success is attributable to the increasing efficiency of the world's financial institutions as finance has proved to be one of the most important causal factors in economic performance. In a series of insightful essays, financial and economic historians examine how financial innovations from the seventeenth century to the present have continually challenged established institutional arrangements, forcing change and adaptation by governments, financial intermediaries, and financial markets. Where these have been successful, wealth creation and growth have followed. When they failed, growth slowed and sometimes economic decline has followed. These essays illustrate the difficulties of co-ordinating financial innovations in order to sustain their benefits for the wider economy, a theme that will be of interest to policy makers as well as economic historians.

The models of portfolio selection and asset price dynamics in this volume seek to explain the market dynamics of asset prices. Presenting a range of analytical, empirical, and numerical techniques as well as several different modeling approaches, the authors depict the state of debate on the market selection hypothesis. By explicitly assuming the heterogeneity of investors, they present models that are descriptive and normative as well, making the volume useful for both finance theorists and financial practitioners. - Explains the market dynamics of asset prices, offering insights about asset management approaches - Assumes a heterogeneity of investors that yields descriptive and normative models of portfolio selections and asset pricing dynamics

A concise analysis of the evolution of monetary policy and banking institutions over the past sixty years that stresses the dynamic interactions between the Federal Reserve and banking institutions that resulted from financial market innovations. Institutions were influenced by increasing competition in markets and monetary policies. The book consists of two parts, which are organized chronologically. The first has chapters that correspond with terms of chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board. It critically analyzes decisions taken by the Federal Open Market Committee in each period and argues that innovations forced changes in the design and conduct of monetary policy. The second part analyzes how banking institutions evolved from a very conservative and regulated system in 1945 to highly inventive financial firms and how this evolution has affected the distribution of credit, wealth, and income in the US.