Studies Reid's moral philosophy and his aesthetics partly by way of an exposition and appraisal of his anatomy of the self, i.e. his division of the mind in terms of its powers and the assignment of the many principles of action to their appropriate levels. A pervasive topic is the consideration of the appropriateness of deterministic computational cognitive science models of Reid's accounts of powers introduced by John Smith III and extensively employed by Keith Lehrer in his important study of Reid's philosophy. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

I: BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF REID Thomas Reid (1710-96) was born at Strachan in Kincardineshire, Scotland, not far from Aberdeen. Reid was fortunate in his family connections. For instance his mother's brother was David Gregory, Savilian professor of Astronomy at Oxford and close friend of Sir Isaac Newton. Reid entered Marischal College, Aberdeen, at the age of twelve after the usual spell in Aberdeen Grammar School. After a short period as college librarian he married his cousin Margaret Gregory, having gained the position of (Presbyterian) minister at New Machar, in the gift of King's College, Aberdeen, which he held from 1737 till 1752. Although Reid published only one paper, An Essay on Quantity, in this period he was far from intellectually idle; for one thing he familiarised himself with the works of Bishop Butler, especially The Analogy of Religion, which, together with those of Samuel Clarke and Isaac Newton, were to have a profound influence on his mature philosophy. In 1752 Reid was appointed a regent at King's College, Aberdeen. During his regency he not only founded a crucially important discussion group, 'The Wise Club', and familiarised himself with David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature both through his own reading and by exhaustive discussion of it within the group; he also wrote extensively. He composed and delivered his seminal Latin Philosophical Orations.

Thomas Reid (1710-96) was one of the most daring and original thinkers of the eighteenth century. His work became the cornerstone of the Scottish School of Common Sense Philosophy, and was highly influential in nineteenth-century America; it also anticipated the thinking of such twentieth-century figures as Moore and Wittgenstein. Now, after a long period of neglect, his philosophy is again the subject of increasing attention across the world. For Reid, knowing about ethics is a matter of having 'good evidence' supplied by a sense-like moral faculty. William Davis's book shows how such a view can be both consistent and plausible in the twenty-first century. Thomas Reid's Ethics begins by characterizing the state of moral epistemology at the time when Reid was writing. It goes on to recount Reid's central claims about the moral sense, and describes the various problems that confront those who would explain and defend his views. Davis lays the foundation for resolving these difficulties by detailing an epistemological conception of evidence which parallels the legal conception of evidence used by the Scottish courts of Reid's day. He then shows how Reid's claims about evidence and self-evidence are best understood in light of this legal model. The book concludes by responding to recent worries about 'moral sense' theories, and offers a final assessment of the success of Reid's ethical project. The book will be of substantial interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary ethics.

This volume offers a fresh view of the work of Thomas Reid, and its significance in his time and ours. A team of leading experts address three broad themes in Reid's philosophy: mind, knowledge, and value. They reveal the vitality of Reid's work, and explore the ways in which current philosophers are engaging with his ideas.

Is morality a subjective matter, dependent on our desires and interests, or are there objective moral truths? And if the latter, can we explain the objectivity of morality without appeal to metaphysics, a robust teleology, or divine command? This book argues that we find just such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's defence of duty. To make this case, this book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism; presents Reid's account of the concept, perception, and motivational force of duty; and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and moral pessimism from the perspective of his moral philosophy. Further, this book argues that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics.

Reid in context / Alexander Broadie -- Thomas Reid and the culture of science / Paul Wood -- Reid on common sense / Nicholas Wolterstorff -- Reid's theory of perception / James Van Cleve / Reid's reply to the skeptic / John Greco -- Nativism and the nature of thought in Reid's account of the external world / Lorne Falkenstein -- Reid and the social operations of mind / C.A.J. Coady -- Reid on memory and the identity of persons / René Van Woudenberg -- Thomas Reid's theory of freedom and responsibility / William L. Rowe -- Reid's moral philosophy / Terence Cueno -- Reid's philosophy of art / Peter Kivy -- Reid's philosophy of religion / Dale Tuggy -- Reid's influence in Britain, Germany, France, and America / Benjamin W. Redekop

This book bears witness to the current reawakening of interest in Reid's philosophy. It first examines Reid's negative attack on the Way of Ideas, and finds him to be a devastating critic of his predecessors. Turning to the positive part of Reid's programme, the author then develops a fresh interpretation of Reid as an anticipator of present-day 'reliabilism'. Throughout the book, Reid is presented as a powerful thinker with much to say to philosophers in the twenty-first century. The book will be of interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary epistemology.