Is morality a subjective matter, dependent on our desires and interests, or are there objective moral truths? And if the latter, can we explain the objectivity of morality without appeal to metaphysics, a robust teleology, or divine command? This book argues that we find just such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's defence of duty. To make this case, this book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism; presents Reid's account of the concept, perception, and motivational force of duty; and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and moral pessimism from the perspective of his moral philosophy. Further, this book argues that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics.

Is morality a subjective matter, dependent on our desires and interests, or are there objective moral truths? And if the latter, can we explain the objectivity of morality without appeal to metaphysics, a robust teleology, or divine command? This book argues that we find just such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's defence of duty. To make this case, this book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism; presents Reid's account of the concept, perception, and motivational force of duty; and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and moral pessimism from the perspective of his moral philosophy. Further, this book argues that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics.

Note on references to the works of Thomas Reid 5 SECTION 1 - Perception Yves Michaud (University of Paris, France) 9 'Reid's Attack on the Theory of Ideas' William P. Alston (Syracuse University, U. S. A. ) 35 'Reid on Perception and Conception' Vere Chappell (University of Massachusetts, U. S. A. ) 49 'The Theory of Sensations' Norton Nelkin (University of New Orleans, U. S. A. ) 65 'Reid's View of Sensations Vindicated' A. E. Pitson (University of Stirling, Scotland) 79 'Sensation, Perception and Reid's Realism' Aaron Ben-Zeev (University of Haifa, Israel) 91 'Reid's Opposition to the Theory of Ideas' Michel Malherbe (University of Nantes, France) 103 'Thomas Reid on the Five Senses' SECTION 2 - Knowledge and COlIIOOn Sense Keith Lehrer (University of Arizona, U. S. A. ) 121 'Reid on Evidence and Conception' Dennis Charles Holt (Southeast Missouri State 145 University, U. S. A. ) 'The Defence of Common Sense in Reid and Moore' T. J. Sutton (University of Oxford, England) 159 'The Scottish Kant?' Daniel Schulthess (university of Berne, Switzerland) 193 'Did Reid Hold Coherentist Views?' VI Claudine Engel-Tiercelin (University of Rouen, France) 205 'Reid and Peirce on Belief' C. A. J. Coady (University of Melbourne, Australia) 225 'Reid on Testimony' SECTION 3 - Mind and Action James Somerville (University of Hull, England) 249 'Making out the Signatures: Reid's Account of the Knowledge of Other Minds' R. F.

Thomas Reid (1710-96) was one of the most daring and original thinkers of the eighteenth century. His work became the cornerstone of the Scottish School of Common Sense Philosophy, and was highly influential in nineteenth-century America; it also anticipated the thinking of such twentieth-century figures as Moore and Wittgenstein. Now, after a long period of neglect, his philosophy is again the subject of increasing attention across the world. For Reid, knowing about ethics is a matter of having 'good evidence' supplied by a sense-like moral faculty. William Davis's book shows how such a view can be both consistent and plausible in the twenty-first century. Thomas Reid's Ethics begins by characterizing the state of moral epistemology at the time when Reid was writing. It goes on to recount Reid's central claims about the moral sense, and describes the various problems that confront those who would explain and defend his views. Davis lays the foundation for resolving these difficulties by detailing an epistemological conception of evidence which parallels the legal conception of evidence used by the Scottish courts of Reid's day. He then shows how Reid's claims about evidence and self-evidence are best understood in light of this legal model. The book concludes by responding to recent worries about 'moral sense' theories, and offers a final assessment of the success of Reid's ethical project. The book will be of substantial interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary ethics.

The pervasiveness of Protestant natural law in the early modern period and its significance in the Scottish Enlightenment have long been recognised. This book reveals that Thomas Reid (1710-1796) - the great contemporary of David Hume and Adam Smith - also worked in this tradition. When Reid succeeded Adam Smith as professor of moral philosophy in Glasgow in 1764, he taught a course covering pneumatology, practical ethics, and politics. This section on practical ethics took its starting point from the system of natural law and rights published by Francis Hutcheson. Knud Haakonssen has reconstructed it here for the first time from Reid's manuscript lectures and papers, and it provides a considerable addition to our understanding not only of Reid but of the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment and of the education system of the time. The present work is a revised version of a work first published by Princeton University Press in 1990 which has long been out of print.