This book presents the theory of Industrial Organization in a unified and concise way. It presents the main models and results in the area, using game theory as a unifying theoretical background. Besides corrections and new sections, the new edition contains a new chapter on games of incomplete information. More than 200 excercises help the reader to understand the results of the book.

This new approach to traditional price theory and to the analysis of imperfect competition represents a breakthrough in the development of a "new" microeconomic theory. Addresses issues in price theory, industrial organization, international trade and regional urban economics.

Concerned primarily with oligopoly, this work includes a general study of pricing in three different markets--perfect competition, perfect monopoly, and imperfect competition. The solutions of these markets offered by Cournot, Smithies, Chamberlin, Stackelberg, Fellner, and Robinson are presented mathematically, followed by the author's own version of the theory of rational pricing in oligopoly. Previous authors have not allowed for all the variables arising from profit and price situations in the market. Here, more realistic assumptions and more complex analyses indicate that sellers in oligopoly situations do not always need to arrange specific agreements--hence, that "administered" pricing does not inevitably occur when the market is dominated by a few producers.

This book takes a radically different approach to the analysis of competition by rejecting the perfect vs. imperfect competition dichotomy and draws on the insights of classical political economists such as Marx, Schumpeter, Hayek and Andrews.