“The Cold War . . . was a fight to the death,” notes Thomas C. Reed, “fought with bayonets, napalm, and high-tech weaponry of every sort—save one. It was not fought with nuclear weapons.” With global powers now engaged in cataclysmic encounters, there is no more important time for this essential, epic account of the past half century, the tense years when the world trembled At the Abyss. Written by an author who rose from military officer to administration insider, this is a vivid, unvarnished view of America’s fight against Communism, from the end of WWII to the closing of the Strategic Air Command, a work as full of human interest as history, rich characters as bloody conflict. Among the unforgettable figures who devised weaponry, dictated policy, or deviously spied and subverted: Whittaker Chambers—the translator whose book, Witness, started the hunt for bigger game: Communists in our government; Lavrenti Beria—the head of the Soviet nuclear weapons program who apparently killed Joseph Stalin; Col. Ed Hall—the leader of America’s advanced missile system, whose own brother was a Soviet spy; Adm. James Stockwell—the prisoner of war and eventual vice presidential candidate who kept his terrible secret from the Vietnamese for eight long years; Nancy Reagan—the “Queen of Hearts,” who was both loving wife and instigator of palace intrigue in her husband’s White House. From Eisenhower’s decision to beat the Russians at their own game, to the “Missile Gap” of the Kennedy Era, to Reagan’s vow to “lean on the Soviets until they go broke”—all the pivotal events of the period are portrayed in new and stunning detail with information only someone on the front lines and in backrooms could know. Yet At the Abyss is more than a riveting and comprehensive recounting. It is a cautionary tale for our time, a revelation of how, “those years . . . came to be known as the Cold War, not World War III.”

A Marginal Revolution Best Book of the Year Winner of the Shulman Book Prize A noted expert on Russian energy argues that despite Europe’s geopolitical rivalries, natural gas and deals based on it unite Europe’s nations in mutual self-interest. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet empire, the West faces a new era of East–West tensions. Any vision of a modern Russia integrated into the world economy and aligned in peaceful partnership with a reunited Europe has abruptly vanished. Two opposing narratives vie to explain the strategic future of Europe, one geopolitical and one economic, and both center on the same resource: natural gas. In The Bridge, Thane Gustafson, an expert on Russian oil and gas, argues that the political rivalries that capture the lion’s share of media attention must be viewed alongside multiple business interests and differences in economic ideologies. With a dense network of pipelines linking Europe and Russia, natural gas serves as a bridge that unites the region through common interests. Tracking the economic and political role of natural gas through several countries—Russia and Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway—The Bridge details both its history and its likely future. As Gustafson suggests, there are reasons for optimism, but whether the “gas bridge” can ultimately survive mounting geopolitical tensions and environmental challenges remains to be seen.

The first edition of The New Cold War was published to great critical acclaim. Edward Lucas has established himself as a top expert in the field, appearing on numerous programs, including Lou Dobbs, MSNBC, NBC Nightly News, CNN, and NPR. Since The New Cold War was first published in February 2008, Russia has become more authoritarian and corrupt, its institutions are weaker, and reforms have fizzled. In this revised and updated third edition, Lucas includes a new preface on the Crimean crisis, including analysis of the dismemberment of Ukraine, and a look at the devastating effects it may have from bloodshed to economic losses. Lucas reveals the asymmetrical relationship between Russia and the West, a result of the fact that Russia is prepared to use armed force whenever necessary, while the West is not. Hard-hitting and powerful, The New Cold War is a sobering look at Russia's current aggression and what it means for the world. This edition includes 30% updated material. It is also fully updated to include an incisive analysis of the Crimean crisis, from Russia's seizure of the region to the dismemberment of Ukraine.

Belarus relies on Russia for about 85% of its total energy needs, while Russia needs Belarus' oil and gas pipelines to export its supplies to Western Europe. How will energy exports from Russia and Belarus' transit capabilities impact Western Europe if this interdependent relationship ends, either through political changes in Belarus or if Russia ends its energy subsidies to Belarus? This report looks at transit, infrastructure and investment issues and analyzes both the state of the current infrastructure, as well as the possibilities this transit opens to Western investors, particularly as the Yamal Pipeline nears completion. In addition, it looks at the current conflict between Belarus and Russian investors for control of the country's gas transit system and oil refineries. This series of reports establishes for the first time the confluence of Russian foreign policy with the acquisition of foreign energy assets by Russian entities. Nine specific country profiles focus on the oil, gas, electricity and nuclear power industries. Each report written by an author of international standing, explains how Russian foreign energy downstream mergers and acquisitions are transpiring to consolidate the new Russian empire.

Offers an innovative look at why science and technology cannot alone meet the needs of energy policy making in the future.

The Russian gas industry provides 50% of Russian domestic energy supplies, a substantial proportion of CIS gas supplies, and around 20% of European gas demand. Declines in production at existing fields mean that Gazprom will face increasingly difficult decisions about moving to higher cost fields on the Yamal Peninsula. The alternative will be increasing imports from Central Asian countries and allowing other Russian gas producers to increase their role in the industry. Russian exports to Europe will gradually increase and deliveries of Russian LNG will commence to Asia and the both coasts of North America. Pipeline gas deliveries to East Asian countries may have a longer time horizon. Export projects aimed at new markets will depend crucially on the maintenance of (oil and) gas prices at the levels of 2003-05. European exports will also depend on the pace of EU market liberalisation and Gazprom's ability to agree mutually acceptable terms for transit, principally with Ukraine and Belarus. Reform, liberalisation and restructuring of the Russian gas industry have been more substantial than has generally been recognised. Most important has been price reform which, in 2005, allowed Russian industrial customers to become profitable to serve at regulated prices. Price increases may significantly reduce future increases in domestic gas demand. The increasing need for production from companies other than Gazprom will ensure that liberalised access to networks expands considerably over the next decade. In the 2000s, Gazprom reclaimed its CIS gas business from intermediaries, while maintaining its de facto monopoly of exports to Europe and establishing a similar degree of authority over future exports to Asia. The merger of Gazprom and Rosneft will provide the potential to become a force in the domestic and international oil markets, particularly given the authority that the president has conferred on the company in terms of Russian energy policy.