Excerpt from The Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations The economic theory of bargaining is built on the cornerstone of self-interest: when the Opportunity arises, profit-seeking individuals will negotiate and attain mutually beneficial agreements. Indeed, negotiation is often viewed as an analogue of or substitute for competitive markets that is, under the right conditions bargaining will generate Pareto efficient economic allocations, as will perfectly competitive markets.1 But perfect negotiations presuppose a number of conditions, in particular, that negotiators are perfectly rational and have perfect information about the bargaining situation. However, Bazerman and Neale (1983; Bazerman, 1983) have provided substantial evidence that negotiators deviate from rationality in systematically predictable ways. Short of the ideal of fully rational behavior, how will negotiations proceed? How should an individual negotiate when only imperfect or limited information about the negotiation setting is available? When he or she has worse information than the other side and both know it? What negotiating procedures are successful in reaching mutually beneficial agreements? About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

"Debating Rationality is a terrific collection of essays written by an obviously first rate set of scholars. Several recent books have attempted to make similar points, but this volume pushes the ideas in new directions, rather than simply restating what are now established themes."--Roderick M. Kramer, co-author of Trust in OrganizationsDecision makers strive to be rational. Traditionally, rational decisions maximize an appropriate return. The contributors to this book challenge the common assumption that good decisions must be rational in this economic sense. They emphasize that the decision-making process is influenced by social, organizational, and psychological considerations as well as by economic concerns. Relationships, time pressure, external demands for specific types of performance, contractual expectations, human biases, and reactions to unfair treatment alter the decision-making context and the resulting decision outcomes.

In the global marketplace, negotiation frequently takes place across cultural boundaries, yet negotiation theory has traditionally been grounded in Western culture. This book, which provides an in-depth review of the field of negotiation theory, expands current thinking to include cross-cultural perspectives. The contents of the book reflect the diversity of negotiation—research-negotiator cognition, motivation, emotion, communication, power and disputing, intergroup relationships, third parties, justice, technology, and social dilemmas—and provides new insight into negotiation theory, questioning assumptions, expanding constructs, and identifying limits not apparent from working exclusively within one culture. The book is organized in three sections and pairs chapters on negotiation theory with chapters on culture. The first part emphasizes psychological processes—cognition, motivation, and emotion. Part II examines the negotiation process. The third part emphasizes the social context of negotiation. A final chapter synthesizes the main themes of the book to illustrate how scholars and practitioners can capitalize on the synergy between culture and negotiation research.

The first full-length work to analyze the closing phase of negotiations, identifying the negotiators' behavior patterns in the endgame.

Electricity-contract auctions have been getting increased attention as they have emerged as a successful mechanism to procure new generation capacity and. This book presents a comprehensive overview of international experiences in auction design and implementation.

For undergraduate and graduate-level business courses that cover the skills of negotiation. This text provides an integrated view of what to do and what to avoid at the bargaining table, facilitated by an integration of theory, scientific research, and practical examples.

During the 1990s, infrastructure concessions were hailed as the solution to Latin America's endemic infrastructure deficit, by combining private sector efficiency with rent dissipation brought about by competition. This publication examines the design and implementation of over 1,000 examples of concession contracts, in order to identify the problems that have occurred in the process. It goes on to highlight lessons to be learned for the future, in order to realise the potential benefits of infrastructure reform and to contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.