Less than a year after the assassination of President Kennedy brought Lyndon B. Johnson to the White House, Harold Wilson became British Prime Minister. Over the next four years, the two men governed their countries through unprecedented crises, both domestic and international. To provide a better understanding of the transatlantic relationship, this volume provides for the first time all the correspondence between Wilson and Johnson from the time Wilson became Prime Minister in October 1964 until Johnson stepped down as President in January 1969. This period witnessed Britain’s accelerated ’retreat from Empire’ and the United States’ correspondingly active role in confronting communist influence across the globe. The letters between Wilson and Johnson reveal the difficulties they faced during this period of transition. In particular, the issue of the Vietnam War looms large, as Wilson’s refusal to commit British forces, and his sponsorship of peace initiatives, served to place severe strain on relations between the two men. Other significant topics which re-occur in the correspondence include American attempts to stiffen Britain’s resolve to preserve the value of the pound, the almost continual British defence reviews, the future of the British Army on the Rhine, the French withdrawal from NATO, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, East-West relations, Britain’s relations with the EEC, the Prague Spring, and the devaluation of sterling. Drawing on material from the Johnson Presidential Library, Wilson’s private papers at the Bodleian Library, and the National Archives of both the United States and the United Kingdom, this collection provides a direct insight into Anglo-American relations at a pivotal moment. For whilst the United States was undoubtedly a superpower on the rise and Britain a declining influence on the world stage, the letters reveal that Johnson was eager for international allies to demonstrate to the American people that the US did not stan

This handbook examines the personal relationships between American presidents and British prime ministers. It aims to determine how personal diplomacy shaped the Anglo-American relationship and whether individual leaders made the relationship “special.” From the great rapprochement of the 1890s to the Cold War and contemporary transatlantic rapport, the Anglo-American relationship has been one of global significance, making presidents and prime ministers central to international security, trade and commerce, culture, and communication. Naturally, it explores the ideas and convictions of presidents and prime ministers, the political parties they led, as well as the political images constructed in the media and how the aura of the Anglo-American relationship might differ from the reality. With a deeper understanding of these political leaders and the relationship they forge with their counterparts, we come that much closer to appreciating the dynamics of transatlantic statecraft.

Examines how German reunification and the end of the Quadripartite Agreement in 1990 impacted the AngloAmerican special relationshipLuca Ratti offers new insights into the role of the Anglo-American aspecial relationship in German reunification, and examines the impact that Germanys reunification had on Anglo-American and transatlantic relations. Germanys unification in October 1990 was one of the most momentous events in modern European history and world politics since the end of World War II. German unity ended the Cold War in Europe, accelerated the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. It also triggered NATOs transformation at the London and Rome summits of the Alliance and deepened Europes political and economic integration with the signing of the treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Key FeaturesAnalyses and compares attitudes, reactions and developments in the US and BritainConsiders their interface with the views and initiatives of the West German governmentOffers new insight into an issue central to Anglo-American and transatlantic relationsIncludes interview with key decision makers involved in the negotiations in 198990 such as John Major, James Baker III, Helmut Khol and Hans Dietrich Genscher