India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) is one of the largest public works programs globally. Understanding the impacts of NREGS and the pathway through which its impacts are realized thus has important policy implications. We use a three-round 4,000-household panel from Andhra Pradesh together with administrative data to explore short- and medium-term poverty and welfare effects of NREGS. Triple difference estimates suggest that participants significantly increase consumption (protein and energy intake) in the short run and accumulate more nonfinancial assets in the medium term. Direct benefits exceed program-related transfers and are most pronounced for scheduled castes and tribes and households supplying casual labor. Asset creation via program-induced land improvements is consistent with a medium-term increase in assets by nonparticipants and increases in wage income in excess of program cost.

This paper uses a three-round 4,000-household panel from Andhra Pradesh together with administrative data to explore short and medium-term poverty and welfare effects of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Triple difference estimates suggest that participants significantly increase consumption (protein and energy intake) in the short run and accumulate more nonfinancial assets in the medium term. Direct benefits exceed program-related transfers and are most pronounced for scheduled castes and tribes and households supplying casual labor. Asset creation via program-induced land improvements is consistent with a medium-term increase in assets by nonparticipants and increases in wage income in excess of program cost.

India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) is one of the largest public works programs globally. Understanding the impacts of NREGS and the pathway through which its impacts are realized thus has important policy implications. We use a three-round 4,000-household panel from Andhra Pradesh together with administrative data to explore short- and medium-term poverty and welfare effects of NREGS. Triple difference estimates suggest that participants significantly increase consumption (protein and energy intake) in the short run and accumulate more nonfinancial assets in the medium term. Direct benefits exceed program-related transfers and are most pronounced for scheduled castes and tribes and households supplying casual labor. Asset creation via program-induced land improvements is consistent with a medium-term increase in assets by nonparticipants and increases in wage income in excess of program cost.

This book offers an assessment of the performance, impact, and welfare implications of the world’s largest employment guarantee programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). Launched by the Indian government, the programme covers entire rural area of the country. The book presents various micro-level analyses of the programme and its heterogeneous impacts at different scales, almost a decade after its implementation. While there are some doubts over the future of the scheme as well as its magnitude, nature and content, the central government appears committed to it, as a ‘convergence scheme’ of various other welfare and rural development programmes being implemented at both national and state level. The book discusses the outcomes of the programme and offers critical insights into the lessons learnt, not only in the context of India, but also for similar schemes in countries in South and South-East Asia as well as in Africa, and Latin America. Adopting inter-disciplinary perspectives in analysing these issues, this unique book uses a judicious mix of methods---integrating quantitative and qualitative tools---and will be an invaluable resource for analysts, NGOs, policymakers and academics alike.

We examine the efficacy of a popular anti-poverty programme, namely the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of the Government of India. We argue that a chronic friction of wage payment delay in this flagship programme could adversely affect the welfare of the poor through two channels. First, it causes deferred consumption. Second, it turns labour into a credit good which makes an indebted household work harder to clear off his existing debt. The loss of welfare persists even when the worker has an outside employment option. If a programme of financial inclusion increases the indebtedness of the poor, a wage payment delay in the NREGA programme could escalate this welfare loss although the official indicator of success (i.e., participation) may not reveal this friction.

MGNREGS has shown striking heterogeneity in pro-poor targeting across states. The declining demand for MGNREGS in recent years is due mainly to local imple-mentation failures that discourage workers. In Andhra Pradesh, MGNREGS significantly improved the welfare of participating households, especially the poor, scheduled castes and tribes, and casual laborers. It is desirable to provide MGNREGS work during the agricultural lean seasons - when work opportunities are scarce - rather than the peak seasons.