Abstract: This paper proposes a simple index of the welfare significance of uncertainty in the public goods resulting as policy outcomes. Our measure is the ex ante compensation an individual would require to accept an uncertain level of service compared to receiving the expected value of the distribution of possible values for that service. Our compensation measure is a function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the variance in the measure of environmental service associated with policy and relevant for the individual, and a set of conventional parameters that describe the properties of nonmarket benefit measures under conditions of certainty. We would expect that the inverse virtual price elasticity of the for the environmental service and the square of the coefficient of relative variation are the primary factors influencing the size of our compensation index

This paper studies the effect of policy uncertainty on the formation of new activities in Romer's (1994) type of an economy, where productivity of labor increases with the number of capital goods. Adding a new capital good requires a capital specific set-up cost, invested prior to using the capital good. Agents are disappointment averse, putting greater utility weight on downside risk [as modeled by Gul (1991)]. Policy uncertainty is induced by the Disappointment aversion implies that investment, labor and capitalists' income drop at a rate proportional to the standard deviation of the tax rate. Hence, policy uncertainty induces first-order adverse effects, whereas policy uncertainty leads to second-order effects when consumers maximize the conventional expected utility. The adverse effects of policy uncertainty can be partially overcome by a proper investment policy. The paper interprets the tax concessions granted to multinationals as a commitment device that helps overcoming the adverse implications of policy uncertainty.

Policy uncertainty can reduce individual welfare when individuals have limited opportunities to mitigate or insure against consumption fluctuations induced by the policy uncertainty. For this reason, policy uncertainty surrounding future Social Security benefits may have important welfare costs. We field an original survey to measure the degree of policy uncertainty in Social Security and to estimate the impact of this uncertainty on individual welfare. On average, our survey respondents expect to receive only about 60 percent of the benefits they are supposed to get under current law. We document the wide variation around the expectation for most respondents and the heterogeneity in the perceived distributions of future benefits across respondents. This uncertainty has real costs. Our central estimates show that on average individuals would be willing to forego around 6 percent of the benefits they are supposed to get under current law to remove the policy uncertainty associated with their future benefits. This translates to a risk premium from policy uncertainty equal to 10 percent of expected benefits.

Abstract: Recent literature has highlighted the importance of new activities in development and growth. It was shown that trade distortions such as tariffs are associated with first-order costs stemming from the induced drop in the formation of new activities. This paper demonstrates that uncertainty may induce similar costs. This argument is illustrated in the context of Romer's model of a dependent economy, where foreign direct investment is needed to enable the importation of capital goods and intermediate products used in domestic production. The present paper shows that uncertainty acts as an implicit tax on new activities, whose incidence is (in a certain sense) worse than that of a tariff in Romer's framework. As with a tariff, uncertainty inhibits the formation of new activities. Unlike the tariff, however, uncertainty does not benefit the government with revenue. The welfare cost of uncertainty applies also for a closed economy. The paper shows that uncertainty-averse entrepreneurs discount using a 'hurdle rate' that exceeds the risk-free interest rate. The gap between the two rates increases with the uncertainty embodied in the investment, being determined by the vagueness of the information and by the range of possible outcomes. Hence, growth may be inhibited by business uncertainty, where the 'rules of the game' for new activities are vague.