"Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman here confronts one of the momentous issues of American history and the American present--the contending prerogatives of the president and Congress in making war." "Lehman, a lively controversialist and scholar, examines the history of American military decision making from the Revolutionary period to the Gulf War. Whose power is it to declare war, to carry it out, and to sustain its course and bring it to an end? In addressing these major constitutional questions, Lehman is vibrantly contemporary, too, writing as a government insider to offer a exceptionally vivid perspective on Operation Desert Storm and recent military actions in Grenada, Libya, Lebanon, and Panama. Arguing vehemently for the primacy of presidential over congressional power, Lehman adds crucial new details to our understanding of the post-Vietnam era of American politics." "Characteristically, Lehman pulls no punches. He sheds provocative new light on congressional investigations into Watergate and Iran-Contra, authoritatively demonstrating the ways in which Congress has created crippling impediments to presidential power. Yet he provides a fresh understanding of the essential role Congress must play in committing the nation to war, and he enumerates how presidents from Jefferson to Bush have interpreted--and misinterpreted--the powers grated them as commander in chief." "John Lehman's enlightening new book makes a invaluable contribution as to whether responsible judgments will be made if and when the nation must again confront the crucial decision of making war."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

The 20 years that have elapsed since the War Powers Resolution (WPR) became law have not diminished any of the controversy to which it was born. Disputes involving its legality, practicability, and applicability have punctuated legislative-executive relations when decisions have been made to commit American troops abroad in which they faced an actual or imminent risk of military conflict. The controversy originates in the inherently ambiguous situations the legislation attempts to clarify, and in the contradictory opinions offered on the WPR's meaning, legitimacy, and relevancy. While almost no one challenges the President's power to repel sudden attacks against the territory of the United States (US), or the right of the Congress to commit the US to war, the WPR attempts to address those more equivocal cases involving the use of armed forces in the absence of a direct military threat to the US or a declaration of war, In doing so, the measure has become inextricably involved with more fundamental issues about the roles and powers of the President and Congress in authorizing the dispatch of US troops to conflicts abroad. Although the President and Congress have periodically used control of the armed forces as a constitutional "invitation to struggle" for over 200 years, President Truman's 1950 decision to commit on his own authority American troops to a major conflict in Korea precipitated the most dramatic confrontation with Congress over this issue until that time. The debate over war powers was joined with greater intensity in the early 1970s with the US mired in a land war in Southeast Asia and encountering huge American casualties. As a result, Congress began to reevaluate its role to ensure timely participation in decisions affecting the deployment of US military forces throughout the world and the commitment of those forces to hostilities involving other states in the international system.