Contains transcripts of certain Senate Foreign Relations Committee executive session hearings. Transcribed hearings are: a. Revision and strengthening of the U.N. Charter. May 11, 12, 19, 1948. p. 1-66. Includes discussion of U.S. policy towards the Brussels Pact and other regional pacts, the furnishing of supplemental military aid to Western Europe, the limitation of veto powers in the U.N., and the need for arms regulation and reduction. Classified material has been deleted; b. Briefing on the London Conferences concerning the status of West Germany. June 3, 1948. p. 67-84. Includes discussion of Western European control and allocation of Ruhr area resources, and the prospects for German reunification. Classified material has been deleted; c. Ratification of NATO Treaty. Feb. 18, Mar. 8, Apr. 5, 12, 19, 21, June 2, 6, 1949. p. 85-324. I ncludes discussion of proposed military aid to Europe and its relation to the Marshall Plan and U.N. programs. Classified material has been deleted.

Conferences concerning the status of West Germany. June 3, 1948. p. 67-84. Includes discussion of Western European control and allocation of Ruhr area resources, and the prospects for German reunification. Classified material has been deleted. c. Ratification of NATO Treaty. Feb. 18, Mar. 8, Apr. 5, 12, 19, 21, June 2, 6, 1949. p. 85-324. Includes discussion of proposed military aid to Europe and its relation to the Marshall Plan and U.N. programs. Classified material has been deleted.

This compelling history brings to life the watershed year of 1948, when the United States reversed its long-standing position of political and military isolation from Europe and agreed to an "entangling alliance" with ten European nations. Not since 1800, when the United States ended its alliance with France, had the nation made such a commitment. The historic North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, but the often-contentious negotiations stretched throughout the preceding year. Lawrence S. Kaplan, the leading historian of NATO, traces the tortuous and dramatic process, which struggled to reconcile the conflicting concerns on the part of the future partners. Although the allies could agree on the need to cope with the threat of Soviet-led Communism and on the vital importance of an American association with a unified Europe, they differed over the means of achieving these ends. The United States had to contend with domestic isolationist suspicions of Old World intentions, the military's worries about over extension of the nation's resources, and the apparent incompatibility of the projected treaty with the UN charter. For their part, Europeans had to be convinced that American demands to abandon their traditions would provide the sense of security that economic and political recovery from World War II required. Kaplan brings to life the colorful diplomats and politicians arrayed on both sides of the debate. The end result was a remarkably durable treaty and alliance that has linked the fortunes of America and Europe for over fifty years. Despite differences that have persisted and occasionally flared over the past fifty years, NATO continues to bind America and Europe in the twenty-first century. Kaplan's detailed and lively account draws on a wealth of primary sources--newspapers, memoirs, and diplomatic documents--to illuminate how the United States came to assume international obligations it had scrupulously avoided for the previous 150 years.

The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was one of the most important accomplishments of American diplomacy in countering the Soviet threat during the early days of the Cold War. Why and how such a reversal of a 150-year nonalignment policy by the United States was brought about, and how the goals of the treaty became a reality, are questions addressed here by a leading scholar of NATO. The importance of restoring Europe to strength and stability in the post-World War II years was as obvious to America as to its allies, but the means of achieving that goal were far from clear. The problem for European statesmen was how to secure much- needed American economic and military aid without sacrificing political independence. For American policymakers, in contrast, a degree of American control was seen as an essential quid pro quo. As Mr. Kaplan shows, the lengthy negotiations of 1947 and 1948 were chiefly concerned with reconciling these opposing views. For the Truman administration, the difficulties of achieving a treaty acceptable to the allies were matched by those of winning its acceptance by Congress and the public. Many Americans saw such an "entangling alliance" as a threat not only to American security but to the viability of the United Nations. Mr. Kaplan demonstrates the tortuous course of the debate on the treaty and the pivotal role of the communist invasion of South Korea in its ultimate approval. This authoritative study offers a timely reevaluation of the origins of an alliance that continues to play a critical role in the balance of power and in the prospects for world peace.