The Access to History series is the most popular and trusted series for advanced level history students, offering: Authoritative, engaging and accessible content Comprehensive coverage of the AS and A level history specifications Design features, study guides and web support to help students achieve exam success This is a new edition which combines content from The USA and Vietnam 1945-75 and new content about the Korean War to give a comprehensive and engaging coverage of the history of the United States' involvement in Asia between 1945 and 1975. The book examines major questions such as: What was the nature of the ideological struggle in South East Asia in the early 1950s? What were the causes, course and consequences of the Korean War? Why did the US become increasingly involved in Vietnam from 1954 to 1968? What led to the US withdrawal from Vietnam during the Nixon presidency? Why did the US fail to win the Vietnam War? Throughout the book, key dates, terms and issues are highlighted, and historical interpretations of key debates are outlined. Summary diagrams are included to consolidate knowledge and understanding of the period, and exam-style questions and tips written by examiners provide the opportunity to develop exam skills. Book jacket.

- Improve your grades by focusing revision. - Build confidence and strengthen exam technique.

This study of ten fateful decisions made on Indochina between 1961-75 highlights the ascent of the civilian militarists and of strategy over diplomacy in United States policymaking and reveals the inexorably interlinked and escalating character of the decisions and the central purpose of American presidents: not to have to face the expected domestic political consequences of defeat in Indochina. As a result, we were led into a prolonged stalemate in which "acting" and the management of programs became a more important preoccupation than thinking about our purposes and values, in which analysis become wholly subjective and therefore defective, and in which decision-making occurred in a closed system which did not allow for divergent inputs.

This study of ten fateful decisions made on Indochina between 1961-75 highlights the ascent of the civilian militarists and of strategy over diplomacy in United States policymaking and reveals the inexorably interlinked and escalating character of the decisions and the central purpose of American presidents: not to have to face the expected domestic political consequences of defeat in Indochina. As a result, we were led into a prolonged stalemate in which "acting" and the management of programs became a more important preoccupation than thinking about our purposes and values, in which analysis become wholly subjective and therefore defective, and in which decision-making occurred in a closed system which did not allow for divergent inputs.

The book starts with an introduction to the events that led to France's withdrawal from Vietnam and US support of Diem's government and goes on to examine how the conflict escalated and the USA became fully involved. The book also looks at the pressure for peace on the US home front and how this had an impact on the eventual withdrawal and fallout from the war. The role of key figures in the conflict, both American presidents and Vietnamese leaders, is analysed throughout. Throughout the book, key dates, terms and issues are highlighted, and historical interpretations of key debates are outlined. Summary diagrams are included to consolidate knowledge and understanding of the period, and exam-style questions and tips for each examination board provide the opportunity to develop exam skills.

This book puts American policy in Southeast Asia and the traumatic events of the second Indochina War into the larger perspective of the Cold War. Levine's wide-ranging work treats everything from the local appeals of Communist parties in the region and the peculiarities of Vietnamese Communism to the development of the domino theory and its consequences, from helicopter warfare to the antiwar movement. Treating harshly some of the orthodoxies that have developed about Vietnam and scathing in its treatment of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, it will interest scholars, students, and veterans of the conflict.