This study provides a brief overview of the US military?s involvement in stability operations and draws out the salient patterns and recurring themes that can be derived from those experiences. It is hoped that a presentation and critical analysis of the historical record will assist today?s Army in its attempts, now well under way, to reassess its long-standing attitudes toward stability operations and the role it should play in them. The US military?s experience in the conduct of stability operations prior to the Global War on Terrorism can be divided chronologically into four periods: the country?s first century (1789-1898); the?Small Wars? experience (1898-1940)7; the Cold War (1945-1990); and the post-Cold War decade (1991-2001). Reference will be made to a group of 28 representative case studies. The list of these case studies can be found at appendix A; synopses of the cases, written by members of the Combat Studies Institute, are located in appendix B.

This Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper (GWOT OP), by Dr. Lawrence Yates, provides his thoughts and analysis of the US Army's participation in stability operations (SO) since 1789. Dr. Yates, a member of the CSI Team since 1981, has spent twenty plus years intensely studying this aspect of Army operations. Prior to his retirement in 2005, CSI asked him to put in writing his impressions formed by his research in this field. The result is this monograph. Dr. Yates makes several key arguments about the Army's involvement in SO. Among the key points he makes is his contention that the Army has an institutional habit of forgetting the lesson learned about SO, when, after conducting a stability operation, it returns to conventional warfare preparation. He also point out, correctly, that the Army, which has participated in far more SO-type activities sine 1789 than it has conventional wars, has hitherto retained a mindset that stability operations are an anomaly rather than the norm in American military operations. It is our hope that this GWOT OP will be of great value in providing the military professional with a broad overview of the history of the US Army's participation in stability operations, and at least one historian's view on how well it performed. Some may disagree with Dr. Yates' views on specific aspects of his analysis; that is well and good. If this GWOT OP stimulates a vigorous debate, Dr. Yates' study will have achieved its purpose.~

This symposium was held 16-18 Sept. 2008 at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The theme, ¿The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives,¿ was designed to explore the partnership between the U.S. Army and government agencies in attaining national goals and objectives in peace and war within a historical context. The symposium also examined current issues, dilemmas, problems, trends, and practices associated with U.S. Army operations requiring interagency cooperation. In the midst of two wars and Army engagement in numerous other parts of a troubled world, this topic is of tremendous importance to the U.S. Army and the Nation. Charts and tables.

This volume provides materials for active learning about peacebuilding and conflict management in the context of complex stability operations. Today, America faces security challenges unlike any it has faced before, many of which requiring lengthy U.S. involvement in stability operations. These challenges are exceedingly dynamic and complex because of the ever changing mix and number of actors involved, the pace with which the strategic and operational environments change, and the constraints placed on response options. This volume presents a series of case studies to inspire active learning about peacebuilding and conflict management in the context of complex stability operations. The case studies highlight dilemmas pertaining to the story of the case (case dilemma) and to its larger policy implications (policy dilemma). The cases stimulate readers to "get inside the heads" of case protagonists with widely differing cultural backgrounds, professional experiences, and individual and organisational interests. Overall, Understanding Complex Military Operations challenges the reader to recognize the importance of specific national security related issues and their inherent dilemmas, deduce policy implications, and discern lessons that might apply to other – perhaps even non-security related – areas of public policy, administration, and management. This volume will be of much interest to students of conflict prevention, transitional justice, peacebuilding, security studies and professionals conducting field-based operations in potentially hazardous environments.