Find out about the 1958 U.S. intervention that succeeded and apply those lessons to today's conflicts in the Middle East In July 1958, U.S. Marines stormed the beach in Beirut, Lebanon, ready for combat. They were greeted by vendors and sunbathers. Fortunately, the rest of their mission—helping to end Lebanon's first civil war—went nearly as smoothly and successfully, thanks in large part to the skillful work of American diplomats who helped arrange a compromise solution. Future American interventions in the region would not work out quite as well. Bruce Riedel's new book tells the now-forgotten story (forgotten, that is, in the United States) of the first U.S. combat operation in the Middle East. President Eisenhower sent the Marines in the wake of a bloody coup in Iraq, a seismic event that altered politics not only of that country but eventually of the entire region. Eisenhower feared that the coup, along with other conspiracies and events that seemed mysterious back in Washington, threatened American interests in the Middle East. His action, and those of others, were driven in large part by a cast of fascinating characters whose espionage and covert actions could be grist for a movie. Although Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon was unique, certainly in its relatively benign outcome, it does hold important lessons for today's policymakers as they seek to deal with the always unexpected challenges in the Middle East. Veteran analyst Bruce Reidel describes the scene as it emerged six decades ago, and he suggests that some of the lessons learned then are still valid today. A key lesson? Not to rush to judgment when surprised by the unexpected. And don't assume the worst.

A wide-reaching analysis of post-World War II U.S. policy in Lebanon posits that the politics of oil and pipelines figured far more significantly in U.S. relations with Lebanon than previously believed. By reevaluating U.S.-Lebanese relations within the context of America's collaborative intervention with the Lebanese ruling elite, Gendzier aptly demonstrates how oil, power, and politics drove U.S. policy as well as influenced the development of the state and region of Lebanon.

The 1958 Lebanon crisis was perceived in the Cold War as a threat to the US, and the Eisenhower government therefore intervened militarily in July 1958. This book focuses on the perceptions, assumptions and considerations that prompted the US to intervene, drawing on White House meetings' data.

President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon made an urgent plea on 14 July 1958 to the governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States to deploy military forces to Lebanon. Received in Washington at 0600 on 14 July, this message became the first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which had been announced in January 1957. The JCS activated a Specified Command, Middle East (SPECOMME), and designated Adm. James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, North Atlantic and Mediterranean, as the Commander in Chief, SPECOMME (CINCSPECOMME). According to a JCS memorandum, These actions marked the beginning of operation 'Blue Bat, ' the first United States airborne-amphibious operation to occur in peacetime. Contents: Doctrine, Planning, Background, Problems, Deployment, Organization, Resupply, Procurement, Civil affairs, Medical support, Security, Plans, Task force 201, On-hand supplies, 31 August 1958.

Irene Gendzier's critically acclaimed, wide-reaching analysis of post-World War II U.S. policy in Lebanon posits that the politics of oil and pipelines figured far more significantly in U.S. relations with Lebanon than previously believed. In 1958 the United States sent thousands of troops to shore up the Lebanese regime in the face of domestic opp

General Gray was contacted by Major Wade to offer input regarding his participation in the 1958 intervention in Lebanon. General Gray responded with this paper which provides information about logistics, and a 'detailed and candid account of his activities.' General Gray also disputed some of the information in the Leavenworth Paper No. 3 (Not war but like war) by historian Dr. Roger Spiller. --