The Unity of Reason is the first major study of Kant's account of reason. It argues that Kant's wide-ranging interests and goals can only be understood by redirecting attention from epistemological questions of his work to those concerning the nature of reason. Rather than accepting a notion of reason given by his predecessors, a fundamental aim of Kant's philosophy is to reconceive the nature of reason. This enables us to understand Kant's insistence on the unity of theoretical and practical reason as well as his claim that his metaphysics was driven by practical and political ends. Neiman begins by discussing the historical roots of Kant's conception of reason, and by showing Kant's solution to problems which earlier conceptions left unresolved. Kant's notion of reason itself is examined through a discussion of all the activities Kant attributes to reason. In separate chapters discussing the role of reason in science, morality, religion, and philosophy, Neiman explores Kant's distinctions between reason and knowledge, and his difficult account of the regulative principles of reason. Through examination of these principles in Kant's major and minor writings, The Unity of Reason provides a fundamentally new perspective on Kant's entire work.

The Architectonic of Pure Reason, one of the most important sections of Kant's first Critique, raises three fundamental questions. What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? Taken together these questions converge on a fourth one, which is at the centre of philosophy as a whole: what is the human being? Lea Ypi suggests that the answer to this question is tied to a particular account of the unity of reason - one that stresses its purposive character. By focusing on the sources, evolution and function of Kant's concept of purposiveness, this book shows that the idea of purposiveness that Kant endorses in the Critique of Pure Reason is a concept of purposiveness as intelligent design, quite different from the concept of purposiveness as normativity that will become central to his later works. In the case of purposiveness as design, the relationship between reason and nature is anchored to the idea of God. In the case of purposiveness as normativity, it is anchored to the concept of reflexive judgment, and grounded on transcendental freedom. Understanding this shift has important implications for some of the most difficult questions that confront the Kantian system: the passage from the system of nature to that of freedom, the relation between faith and knowledge, the philosophical defence of progress in history, and the role of religion. It is also crucial to shed light on the way in which Kant's critique has shaped the successive German philosophical tradition.

The Fate of Reason is the first general history devoted to the period between Kant and Fichte, one of the most revolutionary and fertile in modern philosophy. The philosophers of this time broke with the two central tenets of the modem Cartesian tradition: the authority of reason and the primacy of epistemology. They also witnessed the decline of the Aufkldrung, the completion of Kant's philosophy, and the beginnings of post-Kantian idealism. Thanks to Beiser we can newly appreciate the influence of Kant's critics on the development of his philosophy. Beiser brings the controversies, and the personalities who engaged in them, to life and tells a story that has uncanny parallels with the debates of the present.

The goal of the present book is nothing less than to correct what Alfredo Ferrarin calls the standard reading of Kant s. Ferrarin argues that this widespread form of interpretation has failed to do justice to Kant s philosophy primarily because it is rooted in several uncritical and unjustified assumptions. Two are particularly egregious: a compartmentalization of the First Critique, and an isolation of each Critique from the others. Ultimately these two assumptions cause one to lose sight of the fact that the cognitive/epistemological functions laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic are functions of an overarching pure reason of which the constitution of experience (and of a science of nature) is only one problem among others. This book, by contrast, argues that the main problem, which pervades the entire first critique, is the power that reason has to reach beyond itself and legislate over the world. Ferrarin pays close attention to both the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method where Kant lays out his conception of cosmic philosophy as embodied in the ideal philosopher."

Traces the development of Kant's views on free will from earlier writings through the three Critiques and beyond.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously criticizes traditional metaphysics and its proofs of immortality, free will and God's existence. What is often overlooked is that Kant also explains why rational beings must ask metaphysical questions about 'unconditioned' objects such as souls, uncaused causes or God, and why answers to these questions will appear rationally compelling to them. In this book, Marcus Willaschek reconstructs and defends Kant's account of the rational sources of metaphysics. After carefully explaining Kant's conceptions of reason and metaphysics, he offers detailed interpretations of the relevant passages from the Critique of Pure Reason (in particular, the 'Transcendental Dialectic') in which Kant explains why reason seeks 'the unconditioned'. Willaschek offers a novel interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic, pointing up its 'positive' side, while at the same time it uncovers a highly original account of metaphysical thinking that will be relevant to contemporary philosophical debates.

This Critical Guide provides succinct and in-depth explorations of cutting-edge debates concerning the philosophical significance of Kant's revolutionary Critique of Pure Reason.