The United Nations has sponsored peace-keeping operations in countries all over the world since 1947, but naval forces have rarely been involved, a surprising circumstance, given the utility of navies. The tenets of the National Security Strategy apply to UN peacekeeping operations, and US Naval involvement in these operations would promote US national goals. There is evidence that the UN may soon be involved in maritime operations, and it has begun experimenting with small seagoing forces, for there are many missions applicable to UN control. Over the years, the UN has developed doctrine for the ground forces in peace-keeping operations, but if naval forces are to be integrated into peace-keeping, there are several issues that must be resolved, including command and control, sovereignty, the Law of the Sea, and financing and logistics. These issues are resolvable, and participation of the US Navy in UN operations is recommended. United Nations, peace-keeping, U.S. Navy, naval peace-keeping, peacetime contingency operations.

The deployment of a large number of soldiers, police officers and civilian personnel inevitably has various effects on the host society and economy, not all of which are in keeping with the peacekeeping mandate and intent or are easily discernible prior to the intervention. This book is one of the first attempts to improve our understanding of unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations, by bringing together field experiences and academic analysis. The aim of the book is not to discredit peace operations but rather to improve the way in which such operations are planned and managed.

This edited volume explores stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTR), highlighting the challenges and opportunities they create for the US Navy. The book argues that SSTR operations are challenging because they create new missions and basing modes, and signal a return to traditional naval methods of operation. Mission accomplishment requires collaboration with a wide range of actors representing governmental, non-governmental and commercial organizations, which often creates politically and bureaucratically charged issues for those involved. However, although from a traditional warfighting perspective, stability operations might be viewed as having little to do with preparing for high-intensity conventional combat, these kinds of operations in fact correspond to traditional missions related to diplomacy, engagement, maritime domain awareness, piracy and smuggling, and intervention to quell civil disturbances. SSTR operations can be therefore depicted as a return to traditional naval operations, albeit operations that might not be universally welcomed in all quarters.

This thesis examines the role of the United States in United Nations military operations. In a future that will likely include more instances of U.N. security operations and a U.S. military having to make do with less resources, collective security operations are a logical choice for U.S. decision-makers. The study begins with a discussion of six types of U.N. military Operations, ranging in intensity from humanitarian aid to enforcement and punishment. The study also provides a decision model that accounts for the effects of elite and popular consensus domestically and internationally on the collective security process; Iraq and Bosnia act as illustrative examples. The study then examines the roles played by the U.S. Navy and intelligence community in collective security. In summary, the study concludes that the U.S. military is best suited for operations at either extreme of the collective spectrum. In other instances, limited action by the U.S. Navy or intelligence community are viable alternatives. United Nations, collective security, intelligence sharing, naval cooperation.

The Oxford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations presents an innovative, authoritative, and accessible examination and critique of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Since the late 1940s, but particularly since the end of the cold war, peacekeeping has been a central part of the core activities of the United Nations and a major process in global security governance and the management of international relations in general. The volume will present a chronological analysis, designed to provide a comprehensive perspective that highlights the evolution of UN peacekeeping and offers a detailed picture of how the decisions of UN bureaucrats and national governments on the set-up and design of particular UN missions were, and remain, influenced by the impact of preceding operations. The volume will bring together leading scholars and senior practitioners in order to provide overviews and analyses of all 65 peacekeeping operations that have been carried out by the United Nations since 1948. As with all Oxford Handbooks, the volume will be agenda-setting in importance, providing the authoritative point of reference for all those working throughout international relations and beyond.

Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.