The UK and Multi-level Financial Regulation examines the role of the United Kingdom (UK) in shaping post-crisis financial regulatory reform, and assesses the implications of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union (EU). It develops a domestic political economy approach to examine how the interaction of three domestic groups - elected officials, financial regulators, and the financial industry - shaped UK preferences, strategy, and influence in international and EU-level regulatory negotiations. The framework is applied to five case studies: bank capital and liquidity requirements; bank recovery and resolution rules; bank structural reforms; hedge fund regulation; and the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives. It concludes by reflecting on the future of UK financial regulation after Brexit. The book argues that UK regulators pursued more stringent regulation when they had strong political support to resist financial industry lobbying. UK regulators promoted international harmonisation of rules when this protected the competitiveness of industry or enabled cross-border externalities to be managed more effectively; but were often more resistant to new EU rules when these threatened UK interests. Consequently, the UK was more successful at shaping international standards by leveraging its market power, regulatory capacity, and alliance building (with the US). But it often met with greater political resistance at the EU level, forcing it to use legal challenges to block reform or secure exemptions. The book concludes that political and regulatory pressure was pivotal in defining the UK's 'hard' Brexit position, and so the future UK-EU relationship in finance will most likely be based on a framework of regulatory equivalence.

This text examines the role of the United Kingdom in shaping the reform of financial regulation since the global financial crisis, and assesses the implications of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union.

Extensive literature already exists on the causes and development of the recent financial crisis and the political measures taken to manage it. This book brings together a group of renowned social scientists to focus on the interplay between international, European and national decision-making processes in the reform of financial market regulation. Are those states affected by the crisis adopting internationally negotiated regulations? Or are they instead determining the European and international reform agenda? Are the policies being agreed contributing to greater harmonization of financial regulation in a multilevel political system? Or is the process being dominated by differing national interests? The dominant concern of this book is the way in which the given multilevel structure of financial market regulation has shaped the reform process triggered by the recent financial crisis. Following an agreed set of questions, an international group of scholars deal in separate chapters with the role in the reform process played by international organizations, European authorities, and regulators in the USA, the United Kingdom, and Germany. To provide a detailed view of the vertical and horizontal interactions between these actors, the analysis focuses on a small set of reform issues, including bank structure, bank capital, resolution, and OTC trading of derivatives. The analysis shows to what extent actors at a given political level have both responded to, and shaped reform initiatives in other countries and at other political levels. Consideration is also given to a general shift in international governance, using financial market regulation as a case in point. The final chapter summarizes the pattern of multilevel policy-making resulting from the empirical analyses, highlighting features that distinguish it from familiar studies of multilevel governance in federal regimes and in the European Union.

This book examines the post-crisis international regulation of derivatives by bringing together the international relations literature on regime complexity and the international political economy literature on financial regulation.

In light of on-going global financial crises, the institutional structure of financial regulation is currently a subject of significant academic and practical interest. The financial crisis has called into question the adequacy of financial regulation at the national and supranational levels, and has instigated financial regulatory reforms in major markets overseas. This has included the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, and the programme to split the Financial Services Authority in the UK. This book examines the institutional structure reform of financial regulation from a comparative perspective, exploring both fundamental theories and international experiences. The book explores the three main institutional structures of financial regulation in the world; the sectors-based model, adopted in the US, Mainland China and Hong Kong; the twin-peaks model with Australia and the Netherlands as its pioneers; and the single-regulator model as represented by the former Financial Services Authority in the UK and the Financial Services Agency in Japan. The book contains contributions from renowned experts in the field of financial regulation including Douglas Arner, Jeffrey Carmichael, Robin Hui Huang, Dirk Schoenmaker, and Michael Taylor, and will be of interest to students and researchers of banking and finance law, and comparative economics.

The financial system and its regulation have undergone exponential growth and dramatic reform over the last thirty years. This period has witnessed major developments in the nature and intensity of financial markets, as well as repeated cycles of regulatory reform and development, often linked to crisis conditions. The recent financial crisis has led to unparalleled interest in financial regulation from policymakers, economists, legal practitioners, and the academic community, and has prompted large-scale regulatory reform. The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation is the first comprehensive, authoritative, and state of the art account of the nature of financial regulation. Written by an international team of leading scholars in the field, it takes a contextual and comparative approach to examine scholarly, policy, and regulatory developments in the past three decades. The first three parts of the Handbook address the underpinning horizontal themes which arise in financial regulation: financial systems and regulation; the organization of financial system regulation, including regional examples from the EU and the US; and the delivery of outcomes and regulatory techniques. The final three Parts address the perennial objectives of financial regulation, widely regarded as the anchors of financial regulation internationally: financial stability, market efficiency, integrity, and transparency; and consumer protection. The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation is an invaluable resource for scholars and students of financial regulation, economists, policy-makers and regulators.

The Future of Financial Regulation is an edited collection of papers presented at a major conference at the University of Glasgow in spring 2009, co-sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council World Economy and Finance Programme and the the Australian Research Council Governance Research Network. It draws together a variety of different perspectives on the international financial crisis which began in August 2007 and later turned into a more widespread economic crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008. Spring 2009 was in many respects the nadir since valuations in financial markets had reached their low point and crisis management rather than regulatory reform was the main focus of attention. The conference and book were deliberately framed as an attempt to re-focus attention from the former to the latter. The first part of the book focuses on the context of the crisis, discussing the general characteristics of financial crises and the specific influences that were at work this time round. The second part focuses more specifically on regulatory techniques and practices implicated in the crisis, noting in particular an over-reliance on the capacity of regulators and financial institutions to manage risk and on the capacity of markets to self-correct. The third part focuses on the role of governance and ethics in the crisis and in particular the need for a common ethical framework to underpin governance practices and to provide greater clarity in the design of accountability mechanisms. The final part focuses on the trajectory of regulatory reform, noting the considerable potential for change as a result of the role of the state in the rescue and recuperation of the financial system and stressing the need for fundamental re-appraisal of business and regulatory models.