"Historians and sliders have not been kind to either [General Douglas] MacArthur or the soldiers whom he placed in harm's way in the summer of 1950 ... This study seeks to redress the imbalance that exists between fact and interpretation. For too long historians and soldiers have roundly criticized Task Force Smith's performance, extrapolated from its fate a set of assumptions about what constitutes readiness, and then used those assumptions to condemn the entire Eighth Army. The reality is much more complex. A proper examination of the historical record reveals wide disparities in the readiness and combat effectiveness of the subordinate units of America's first forward-deployed Cold War field force ... This work will demonstrate how units achieved that readiness by means of case studies of four infantry regiments, one from each of the four infantry divisions that constituted the Eighth Army in 1950. It synthesizes contemporary training doctrine, training records generated by maneuver units, unit histories, reports of inspections by outside agencies, contemporary self-assessments, and the observations of veterans who served in Japan in the fifteen months before the outbreak of the Korean War. It challenges the long-standing reputation of the Eighth Army as flabby, dispirited, and weak"--Introduction.

When North Korea attacked the South on June 25, 1950, United States forces in East Asia were under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, whose largest ground force was Eighth US Army. This army fought a tenacious defense of South Korea, counterattacked north to the Yalu River with the separate X Corps, before falling back in the face of massive Chinese intervention, conducted a war of movement, and settled into a bloody two-year long period of static warfare. This title examines the combat mission, organization, and evolution of the Eighth US Army in Korea and its 300,000 US ground forces through highly detailed orders of battle, tables of organization and equipment, and examinations of crucial aspects such as doctrine, training, and tactics.

Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.

"In three days the number of so-called 'volunteers' reached over three hundred men. Very quickly they organized us into military units. Just like that I became a North Korean soldier and was on the way to some unknown place." -- from the book South Korean Lee Young Ho was seventeen years old when he was forced to serve in the North Korean People's Army during the first year of the Korean War. After a few months, he deserted the NKPA and returned to Seoul where he joined the South Korean Marine Corps. Ho's experience is only one of the many compelling accounts found in Voices from the Korean War. Unique in gathering war stories from veterans from all sides of the Korean War -- American, South Korean, North Korean, and Chinese -- this volume creates a vivid and multidimensional portrait of the three-year-long conflict told by those who experienced the ground war firsthand. Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li include a significant introduction that provides a concise history of the Korean conflict, as well as a geographical and a political backdrop for the soldiers' personal stories.

The history of the 24th Infantry regiment in Korea is a difficult one, both for the veterans of the unit & for the Army. This book tells both what happened to the 24th Infantry, & why it happened. The Army must be aware of the corrosive effects of segregation & the racial prejudices that accompanied it. The consequences of the system crippled the trust & mutual confidence so necessary among the soldiers & leaders of combat units & weakened the bonds that held the 24th together, producing profound effects on the battlefield. Tables, maps & illustrations.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.